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Chapter 1: Framework and Guiding Questions 
There is a sense in which the solution to the question ‗Should we pursue 
knowledge of x?‘ might strike us as an easy one. Knowledge has been, and continues 
to be, understood as unquestionably valuable, not just within the confines of 
academic philosophy, but also in the wider setting of our everyday lives. This drive 
for and love of knowledge, when taken to extremes, has even been given a name: 
epistemophilia (Townley 37). In the work that follows, I will challenge the 
inclination to uncritically suppose that we should pursue knowledge of x—at least 
not without careful consideration of what ‗knowledge of x‘ amounts to in the context 
of our deeply relevant, though often ignored, subjective life-circumstances. 
A few key questions stand out as those for which I would like to provide an 
answer through the course of this inquiry. The most central of all is undoubtedly this: 
is knowledge always better than ignorance? More specifically, are there special cases 
where it would be epistemically virtuous for us to avoid the seeking of knowledge at 
all costs, and prefer not-knowing, or knowing-that-we-don‘t-know? What are these 
special cases? What are potential mitigating circumstances?  
I will argue that, in some cases, pursuing knowledge is not always advisable. I 
will be careful to distinguish between cases where the knowledge itself is harmful, 
and cases where the pursuit of knowledge is harmful. I will maintain that there are 
instances of each, and both are relevant when we turn our focus to instances of 
epistemic harm. For it does not seem surprising that knowledge can be harmful to us 
emotionally. The knowledge that I am a carrier of a gene predisposing me to breast 
cancer, or that my partner has been unfaithful, are virtually uncontested examples of 
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cases where knowledge can be emotionally harmful. More surprising is my claim 
that in some cases knowledge, and the pursuit of that knowledge, can be harmful to 
us as knowers. Although my thesis resists our ordinary intuitions, I will show that 
there is at least room for such a position within the framework of virtue 
epistemology and there are even a few voices willing to join in. 
In saying that pursuing knowledge can be harmful to us as knowers, it seems 
like I am saying that pursuing knowledge is getting in the way of having knowledge. 
This is because harm to us as knowers just sounds like anything that prevents us 
from achieving knowledge. This is the wrong way of thinking about my project, and 
a way of thinking that I need to be really careful to avoid. There are certain types of 
knowledge, such as biomedical/scientific knowledge, that can get in the way of other 
ways of knowing, such as knowing what it is like, knowing how to get things done, 
and social/personal knowing. I argue that preference for information seeking of the 
biomedical/scientific type can be harmful to us as knowers because it shuts off 
avenues for other epistemic goods. Knowing what it is like, I believe is a distinct end 
product from simply gleaning information of the biomedical/scientific type we have 
come to prefer as a society. 
A real tension arises when, on the one hand, I want to focus my inquiry on 
harms that are specifically of an epistemic variety, and, on the other hand, I want to 
say that knowledge and the drive for knowledge aren‘t necessarily good. If epistemic 
harms cash out in terms of harm to us as knowers (which I think they do), it is hard to 
see how these claims can be made to be consistent. Isn‘t harm to us as knowers harm 
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that just interrupts our achievement of knowledge? At first blush, it certainly seems 
so. I do, however, see at least one potential approach to resolving this tension. 
Perhaps what we mean by harm to us as knowers is not simply the interruption 
of knowledge acquisition. When we talk about ourselves as knowers, it is my 
contention that we mean something more robust than merely vessels of knowledge. 
Or, if that is what we mean, then it must be the case that we mean something more 
robust by ‗knowledge‘ than simply warranted propositional beliefs. The problem 
arises, it seems, from thinking about knowledge as something separate or separable 
from all of the other things that we do—from thinking about ourselves as knowers as 
somehow ourselves abstracted from ourselves as mothers, lovers, or baseball players. 
The problems raised in traditional epistemology are those best represented by 
this kind of purification of the subject and the object of knowledge. But these aren‘t 
the real subjects or objects of knowledge. Knowledge is often not of the 
straightforward propositional variety preferred by epistemologists, nor are knowers 
somehow separable from the other roles they take up. Take the problem of testimony, 
for example. As it arises in the literature, the problem is not phrased as ―as the kind of 
person we are, how much authority can we ascribe to a speaker, as the kind of person 
they are, about some claim, as the kind of claim that it is?‖ Yet, this is how it presents 
in actuality: as a patient, how much authority should we ascribe to our doctor about 
the claim that we should take a certain medication? As a citizen, how much authority 
should we ascribe to the Chairman of the Federal Reserve about the claim that the 
economy may enter a double-dip recession? 
        Instead, we are asked to consider the problem of testimony abstractly. That is, 
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regardless of the kind of person we are, how much authority should we ascribe to 
some speaker, regardless of the kind of person they are, about some claim, regardless 
of the kind of claim that it is? How often does the problem of testimony present itself 
regardless of who we are, or who the speaker is, or of the nature of the claim? It is my 
contention that it doesn‘t ever present this way. Or, if it does, it is not at all 
representative of the problem of testimony as we most often face it. It is not just that 
what is interesting is missed when we abstract away features of the world for some 
artificially purified case of knowledge; it is that what is real is missed. For this very 
reason, the fiction of a detached observer—some fragment of ourselves able to step 
outside of the situation, take in information, assess, and reengage, needs to be 
avoided. 
 
So what features do we need to include about knowers to make our theorizing 
about them productive and applicable? We have two complimentary options for 
solving this puzzle. First, if we retain a picture of us as knowers similar to mere 
vessels, then what picture of knowledge will suit? How will the inclusion of these 
features of this broader notion of knowledge avoid the tension I in my project that I 
identified above? That is, if we do not have a detached conception of ourselves as 
knowers and an abstract conception of knowledge, can we avoid the worry about 
pitting knowledge against our needs and interests as knowers? 
To begin, let us address the additional features of knowers and knowledge that 
we might need then investigate why including them situates us to avoid the tension 
that has arisen. Approaches to epistemology that suggest some possible features of 
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knowers and knowledge relevant to resolving this tension include feminist 
epistemology and virtue epistemology—feminist epistemology because it 
unequivocally argues that features of the knower (in particular, the gender of the 
knower) are relevant to identifying and characterizing cases of knowledge. 
In her essay, ―Taking Subjectivity into Account,‖ Lorraine Code argues that 
relevant factors concerning a subject‘s situatedness, such as race, class, or gender, 
ought to be considered in any investigation of what the subject can or cannot rightly 
be said to know. She writes, ―…conditions that hold for any knower, regardless of her 
or his identity, interests, and circumstances, in other words of her or his 
subjectivity—could conceivably be discovered only for a narrow range of artificially 
isolated and purified empirical knowledge claims, which might be paradigmatic by 
fiat, but are unlikely so ‗in fact‘‖ (Code 191). She argues for what she calls an 
―epistemology of everyday lives‖ and urges that we turn away from artificially 
sterilized models of knowledge that steer clear of what she takes to be the highly 
relevant circumstances of located knowers (Code 192). 
Code begins her argument with an assault on traditional ―s knows that p‖ 
epistemologies for their (often implicit) assumption that ‗s‘ and ‗p‘ are merely place 
holders which can be replaced by any s or any p, and maintain efficacy. When you 
begin to scrutinize the kinds of things you substitute for s and p, however, such a 
schema loses its capacity to represent many natural knowledge claims. According to 
her interpretation of such approaches to representing knowledge claims, it follows 
that: ―If one cannot transcend subjectivity and particularities of its ‗locations,‘ then 
there is no knowledge worth analyzing‖ (192). Only a narrow subset of human 
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knowledge claims, according to Code, can be isolated and analyzed by an 
epistemology which does not attend to the subjectivity of the knower. 
For Code, and for us, the location of the knower—his or her social identity, 
interests or desires, and circumstances of her situation—make it the case (or not) that 
some knowledge is desirable, undesirable, or even possible. As knowers we are not 
different from ourselves as patients or poets. What we can be said to know, what we 
set out to know, is limited, shaped, and driven by our location. Knowing is not 
something that we do apart from all of the other things that we do. Knowing is 
embedded in, constitutive of and constituted by our locations. 
The implication of this wider view of ourselves as knowers for the resolution 
of the tension arising from supposing that knowledge can be harmful to us as knowers 
means that harm caused to us by the pursuit or acquisition of knowledge that 
influences our location too influences us as knowers. Knowledge or knowledge 
seeking that changes our relationship with our spouse, children, or coworkers changes 
us as knowers. It circumscribes what we can know, how we can know, if we should 
know, whether we want to know, and so on. It could be objected here that a 
consequence of this claim is that any harm is an epistemic harm. Suppose you are cut 
from the basketball team. This amounts to an epistemic harm in that you no longer 
satisfy the role of basketball player and any and all knowledge available to you 
through that role is no longer accessible to you. In a way, this seems right, but it is not 
the kind of case that I am interested in. I am interested in cases where our epistemic 
behavior, or the epistemic behavior of others, impacts us as knowers, and potentially 
doing so through impacting us as the other kinds of things that we are. 
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 I want to be even more careful here, however, and point out further that I am 
also not focusing on epistemic behavior that is necessarily malicious or otherwise 
morally objectionable. Spying on someone, torture, or reading another‘s personal 
diary are examples of efforts at obtaining knowledge that are malum in se, and can 
clearly cause harm (emotional, physical, epistemic) to both the subjects and the 
objects of knowledge. I am, instead, interested in problems that attach to coming to 
know, but not just because we are going about obtaining that knowledge in a bad 
way. Asking a mutual friend about the circumstances of a potential date‘s messy 
divorce shuts down ways the date may come to tell you something about the situation. 
It is not morally wrong to ask your friend ahead of time, but it does potentially limit 
what you stand to gain from the individual themselves, and further, it can undermine 
your prospective date‘s role as a legitimate source of knowledge about themself. 
To sum up, then, the implication of the wider view of ourselves as knowers 
for the resolution of the tension arising from supposing that knowledge can be 
harmful to us as knowers means that harm caused to us by the pursuit or acquisition 
of knowledge that influences our location also influences us as knowers. We have 
further limited cases of interest to those of harm caused by epistemic activity, and 
specifically epistemic activity of a non-morally objectionable type. While the above 
considerations are promising for resolving the tension at issue, we are still left with an 
additional avenue of pursuit. Rethinking what we mean by knowledge is an additional 
(but not incompatible) approach for resolving the tension between knowledge and 
epistemic harm. Again, what we want to avoid is a depiction of knowledge that is 
somehow separate or separable from all of the other things that we do. Similarly, we 
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want to avoid a narrowing of the epistemic, or the conflation of knowledge with 
epistemic good. Virtue epistemology is certainly poised to avoid this confusion. 
 Virtue epistemologists themselves, however, seem to operate with something 
of a pretheoretic assumption about the value of knowledge. Inquiry concerning the 
value of knowledge in virtue epistemology and elsewhere centers around attempts at 
singling out the peculiar value of knowledge over and above mere true belief (a fact 
which suggests that there is some presupposed value for which they are making a 
case). How this value can be said to be attributed to knowledge largely focuses on the 
route taken to achieving it. For virtue epistemologists, the answer lies in determining 
whether it was the subject‘s intellectual virtues that led him or her to said knowledge. 
A belief gained by accident or luck is regarded as less valuable than one gained 
through, for example, scrutiny, open-mindedness, or intellectual courage. In fact, it is 
a key contention of many virtue epistemologists that appealing to such intellectual 
virtues is the only way to achieve a satisfactory answer to the question of the peculiar 
value of knowledge. In this way virtue epistemologists hope to account for the value 
of knowledge over mere true belief. 
However, virtue epistemologists typically rely on the presumed value of 
knowledge in conceiving of epistemic virtues as such. Virtues, whether epistemic or 
moral, require a motivational component. What, according to many virtue 
epistemologists, makes epistemic virtues epistemic is that they are guided by a 
motivation for knowledge. What makes them virtues is that this motivation for 
knowledge is (presumably) a good one. What I want to suggest, and what would 
allow us to retain virtue epistemology as an approach to solving some of the problems 
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I have posed, is that a wider notion of what we mean by ‗knowledge‘ can help us 
resolve the tension between knowledge and the avoidance of epistemic harm. Perhaps 
what virtue epistemologists take as virtuously motivating epistemic virtues is not 
knowledge simply understood. Perhaps, instead it is some wider notion of epistemic 
good. That is, ‗knowledge‘ may just be shorthand for some set of ends that 
intellectual virtues are properly aimed at. I find some support for this suspicion in 
Roberts and Wood‘s Intellectual Virtue. The list of epistemic goods derivable from 
their work is not exhausted by knowledge. Instead, they include alongside knowledge 
understanding, appreciation, and acquaintance. In a contention that ought to feel 
familiar at this point, the authors write, ―the focus on belief in these debates [the 
traditional debates of epistemology, e.g. externalism/internalism] seems to sideline 
some of the epistemic goods that must be kept in mind if one is to see ―knowledge‖ 
fully in the context of the fullest human life […] So the epistemology that focuses 
exclusively on knowledge and makes knowledge some kind of belief or other had 
tended to neglect some of the most interesting and important aspects and kinds of 
knowledge (35).‖ 
How does reconfiguring what we mean by ‗knowledge‘ to include some of 
these other epistemic goods help us resolve the tension between knowledge and the 
avoidance of epistemic harm—that is, harm to us as knowers? Well, harm to us as 
knowers would, on this interpretation, include harm to us as, say, understanders or 
appreciaters. It is easy to see how the pursuit of knowledge (here: facts, information: 
knowledge that p) could undermine us as understanders or appreciaters of an 
object.  Take a trip to your local museum as an example. Upon entering, you might be 
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offered a headset capable of guiding you through an audio tour of the exhibit halls. 
While utilizing the headset for an audio tour shouldn‘t be understood as wrong, the 
experience you will have at the museum is qualitatively different from the one you 
would have without using the headset. You may learn a lot more facts about the 
individual pieces of art, that is, become a great deal more knowledgeable about them, 
but the constant influx of these facts may actually impede a kind of appreciation of 
the art that is available to you through quiet, personal reflection, or even casual 
conversation with other museum-goers. 
 So your trip to the museum can contribute to you as a knower in multiple 
ways. It may be a highly informative experience, with you leaving with a stockpile of 
new information about art, or it may be an experience of some greater appreciation 
for art, one not achieved through an accumulation of facts, but instead through 
intimate personal reflection on a piece of art. You should be reminded here of the 
previous example regarding the asking of a friend about the details of a past divorce 
of a potential date. In both of these cases, the way we have pursued information is not 
in any way wrong, but it can still be understood as limiting us as knowers—in that we 
are potentially limiting an understanding of the divorce available through the 
prospective date alone, or an appreciation of art available through our own personal 
encounter with it, one not mediated by a stream of propositional facts about the artist 
or the artwork itself. Certain ways of coming to know can get in the way of a proper 
understanding.  
To bring us back full-circle then, Roberts and Wood write ―the functioning of 
‗intellect‘ is shot through with ‗will.‘ The life of the intellect is just as much a matter 
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of loves, concerns, desires, emotions and the like as other parts of our lives‖ (40). A 
more robust picture of ourselves as knowers, or of what we mean by knowledge helps 
us understand how knowledge, when conceived of simply (i.e. facts, information), 
and the pursuit of that knowledge may be harmful to us as knowers. It may impact 
our ability to achieve other epistemic ends (e.g. understanding, appreciation) or it 
may alter our location. The tension, then, between knowledge and the avoidance of 
harm to us as knowers is only apparent. 
        The central claim of this project, then, is that there are instances where the 
pursuit of knowledge inhibits our epistemic well-being. In these instances we are 
better off epistemically to resist the urge to pursue (certain sorts of) knowledge, 
recognize our ignorance and, in so doing, enhance our epistemic well-being. 
        I believe that a schema borrowed from nursing epistemology will be 
helpful in guiding us through the remainder of this work: Liaschenko and Fisher 
develop a highly useful framework in nursing epistemology for the types of 
knowledge used by nurses on the job. It includes three primary types of knowledge: 
biomedical/scientific; patient knowledge; and person knowledge. These types of 
knowledge are connected by social knowledge. 
Biomedical/scientific knowledge is the type of knowledge that nurses gain both 
on the job and in their schooling. It has to do with anatomy and physiology, different 
technologies used in patient care, such as EKG‘s and ultrasound, and knowledge of 
pharmaceuticals. 
Patient knowledge is understood by Liaschenko and Fisher as 
biomedical/scientific knowledge now applied to the case at hand. So patient 
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knowledge has to do with monitoring how the patient is responding to therapeutic 
practices employed in their case. 
Person knowledge has to do with the patient in the context of their everyday 
life. It requires testimony from the patient and perhaps family or friends regarding 
what kind of work they do, what their home life is like, what relationships and help 
they have, etc.. Liaschenko and Fisher have reservations about the amount of person 
knowledge it is appropriate for nurses to have in a given context. It is my contention 
that person knowledge is undervalued. 
Liaschenko and Fisher argue that social knowledge connects these three types 
of knowledge. For example, social knowledge connecting biomedical/scientific 
knowledge to patient knowledge might be the knowledge a nurse has of a particular 
surgeon. They may know things about the surgeon such as what types of pain 
medication they tend to order for their patients, how practiced they are and what 
techniques they use for a given surgical procedure, etc. The social knowledge 
connecting patient knowledge to person knowledge would include things like what 
the family members say or know about the patient‘s wishes, information gleaned 
from other nurses about the patient at shift change, etc. 
Here is a depiction of her framework of nursing knowledge as they see it: 
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Figure 1.1 Nursing Knowledge 
 
I want to argue two things about this framework: First, I believe that it has wider 
applicability than to just nursing knowledge. I believe that it can help us understand 
much more than the types of knowledge nurses have. I believe that it applies to 
physicians, patients, and the general public. While the issues I raise are especially 
relevant in heath care contexts, I will demonstrate in my conclusion that they have 
wider applicability.  
Second, I believe that something goes wrong when one of these types of 
knowledge is privileged over others. That is, when we have a preference for (as a 
society, as healthcare consumers and workers) biomedical knowledge, the other two 
types of knowledge, most importantly, person knowledge gets pushed aside. 
Prospectus 
        Before continuing then, it is prudent to give a brief overview of 
Biomedical/Scientific 
Knowledge 
(Case Knowledge) 
Patient Knowledge Person Knowledge 
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the project that follows: 
The knowledge-seeking behavior that guides scientific, academic, and everyday 
inquiry is ordinarily thought to be harmless, even heralded.  If given the option to 
know x or not to know x, I am likely to choose to gain that lacking knowledge of x. It 
is this inclination that has driven my academic career in philosophy and the sciences. 
I am curious. I seek out knowledge where there is wonder. This tendency in myself 
was abruptly challenged by a personal experience I had with pursuing knowledge of 
my unborn child during pregnancy. The impetus of my project is captured in the 
investigation encompassed by the second chapter of this project. I began asking 
relatively harmless questions of my own pregnancy: Was she healthy? Was she 
growing well? Was she safe? Was she ready to enter the world? The desire to replace 
worry, even wonder, with knowledge set off a seemingly irreversible chain of events 
resulting in an undue escalation of intervention in pregnancy; this escalation led to 
considerable epistemic harms suffered by me, the mother, and completely 
unnecessary physical harms suffered by my child.  
Pregnancy is normally accompanied by a good deal of questioning. Is the 
baby healthy? Is it a boy or a girl? When is she due? But these questions, and the 
well-established routes taken to answering them in perinatal medicine, are highly 
capable of running amok. One such method—the use of ultrasound in a normal 
pregnancy—is precisely what set off a physically and epistemically harmful 
escalation of medical intervention during my pregnancy. The suspicious but merely 
probabilistic results of an ordinary 20-week ultrasound led to two amniocenteses, 
weekly ultrasound imaging, emergency cesarean section surgery, and early delivery.  
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Physical harm aside, in this chapter I will explore the serious epistemic harms 
caused by the escalation of intervention in pregnancy and the relentless pursuit of 
medical intervention. I will rely on the help of Barbara Katz-Rothman and Miranda 
Fricker to show that the pursuit of medical intervention in my pregnancy amounted to 
epistemic imperialism and resulted in hermeneutical injustice. This example 
illustrates for us a case where the questions being asked and the attempts at answers 
given are set out by someone other than the person who ought to be in charge—the 
mother. This infraction makes her a victim of hermeneutical injustice, a flavor of 
epistemic injustice characterized by infringement upon the sufferer‘s ability to make 
meaning for him or herself (Fricker 147).  
What I believe is uniquely interesting about this case of hermeneutical 
injustice, and what makes is central to our conversation, is that I am not arguing that 
the mother (mothers, me) has some kind of special access to knowledge unavailable 
to her providers. Instead, what is being argued is that the preference for having the 
kind of knowledge available through medical diagnostics may be unfounded, and the 
quest for this kind of information disrupts the course and experience of pregnancy. I 
believe that this issue translates more generally, and that the quest for certain kinds of 
knowledge, when inattentive to the peculiarities of the knower and the known, is not 
always advisable.  
In this chapter I will demonstrate that it is critical to attend to motivation, 
privacy, probabilistic knowledge, distribution of epistemic agency. I will suggest 
some strategies for moving toward solutions, including an anecdote from 
Wittgenstein, and particularly, the work of Lorraine Code on the subjectivity of the 
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knower and the known. I take this to be an exceptionally personal example of a 
circumstance where knowledge-of-x may not be preferred to ignorance. This example 
evidences one of the few instances where the knowledge itself was harmful.   
My third chapter investigates the role of epistemic imperialism (unduly 
privileging knowledge of a certain sort, and methods of achieving knowledge of a 
certain sort, over other available knowledge/methods) and power imbalances between 
physicians, patients, and nurses in how nursing knowledge is received, represented, 
and understood by not simply the players at stake (e.g. the physician, patient, and 
nurses) but also the general public. I argue that what nurses know, and the work that 
they perform is often rendered invisible to patients, physicians, nurses, and the 
general public by the function of these power structures and epistemic imperialism. 
 Nurses operate with three types of special knowledge: case 
(biomedical/scientific), patient (applied case knowledge), and person (biographical 
knowledge of patient) and because they operate with patient and person knowledge 
rather than just case knowledge (biomedical/scientific knowledge), they are better 
able to care for patients in the face of ignorance about the biomedical/scientific 
knowledge than physicians are. Because nursing is a boundary discipline, in that it 
operates both in and between two very different realms of knowledge (the 
scientific/biomedical realm and the subjective/personal realm), much of what nurses 
are up to in their day-to-day tasks is unseen or unacknowledged by patient, physician, 
and public and is not even recognized by nurses themselves as constituting work 
(Stein-Parbury and Laischenko, 2007; Laischenko and Fisher, 1999). 
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In chapter three I will discuss, through personal narrative this imbalance in 
power between nurses and physicians. I will demonstrate that there is not just a 
hierarchical power structure at play, but also an imbalance of epistemic power and 
what is taken to be valuable knowledge. I will argue that this case brings to light 
issues of testimonial injustice, privileging certain kinds of knowledge over others, the 
relationship between love, care, trust, and knowledge. Finally, I will look at solutions 
including a shared knowledge base for doctors and nurses, overcoming epistemic 
imperialism, as well as some inferences from Miranda Fricker on overcoming 
testimonial injustice. 
In my fourth chapter, I will explore the understanding of minority groups—in 
this case, individuals who identify as disabled. I will demonstrate that hermeneutical 
injustice, as conceived by Miranda Fricker and José Medina, is at play as well as 
intentional ignorance, and ignorance as a tendency, in line with the work of Charles 
Mills. I will suggest some solutions including epistemic humility, recognized 
ignorance, and, most robustly, Maria Lugones‘ notion of ―World traveling.‖ In this 
section, I will explore the notion of Hermeneutical Injustice, as coined by Miranda 
Fricker, yet operate with a somewhat revised conception of what is meant by 
hermeneutical injustice—one which has been deeply informed by José Medina‘s 
work with the term. In this conception, I agree that there is indeed an epistemic 
injustice occurring—the inability of an individual or group to make sense of his, her, 
or their experience—but attend to the concern of to whom they are attempting to 
make sense of these experiences. In line with Medina, I argue that it is possible for an 
individuals and groups to make sense of and regardless of hegemonic uptake. Thus, 
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hermeneutical injustice occurs when there is no corresponding uptake by the 
dominant discourse. I argue that hermeneutically marginalized groups are indeed 
bestowed with hermeneutical resources and that, furthermore, in line with the 
contentions of Medina, they are even possibly better positioned to possess epistemic 
virtues less accessible to those who are not epistemically and generally oppressed. I 
argue that, since we are all contributors to the hermeneutical resources of the 
dominant discourse, we are all obliged to make room for divergent views.  
Finally, in fleshing out what these obligations look like, what they amount to, 
I will turn to the work of Mariá Lugones and argue that it is only through sustained, 
often uncomfortable, interpersonal contact with the epistemic other that we can 
overcome hermeneutical injustice. Moreover, I will demonstrate that knowing what it 
is like is the distinct end product of this contact, which Lugones terms ―world 
traveling‖ and that, in order to fully appreciate and know what it is like, one has to 
struggle with and possibly abandon some, perhaps many, of our self-perceived 
identity traits. Knowing what it is like via world traveling necessitates dramatically 
altering our own identity.  
In this chapter I want to explore not simply this case of testimonial injustice, 
but also how ignorance plays a role in my project. I will explore the discipline of 
epistemology of ignorance, which maintains that ignorance is more than simply a lack 
of knowledge. It is something worth theorizing about. A forerunner in the 
epistemology of ignorance is Nancy Tuana. She writes in defense of her pursuit that 
It is important that our epistemologies not limit attention simply to what is known or 
what is believed to be known. If we are to fully understand the complex practices of 
knowledge production and the variety of features that account for why something is 
known, we must also understand the practices that account for not knowing, that is, 
for out lack of knowledge about a phenomena or, in some cases, an account of the 
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practices that results in a group unlearning what was once a realm of knowledge. In 
other words, those who would strive to understand how we know must also develop 
epistemologies of ignorance.¶ Ignorance, far from being a simple lack of knowledge 
that good science aims to banish, is better understood as a practice with supporting 
social causes as complex as those involved in knowledge practices. (194-195) 
 
By drawing on the work of Nancy Potter, Mariá Lugones, Nancy Tuana, and 
others, I will explore the important role ignorance plays in trust and knowledge across 
lines of power and privilege. Of course, unacknowledged ignorance has played an 
important role in constructing inequalities, especially epistemic inequalities. 
However, recognized ignorance and acknowledgement also has an important role to 
play in healing them. Recognizing that there are things you don‘t know, even things 
you can‘t know, about another is critical to rightly understanding them as full-fledged 
epistemic agents. 
I will then conclude my work with a summary of the problems raised in 
chapters two through four. I will offer a robust potential solution incorporating 
insights from suggested solutions raised in chapters two through four.  I will highlight 
the epistemic harms we have encountered including: (1) epistemic unsustainability—
pursuing knowledge in reckless or disrespectful ways which prevent you or any who 
comes after you from ever gaining knowledge from that source again in the 
future;  (2) epistemic imperialism—unduly privileging knowledge of a certain sort, 
and methods of achieving knowledge of a certain sort, over other available 
knowledge/methods; (3) losing knowledge by raising our standards of proof for what 
we count as knowledge (I will argue that we can actually lose knowledge we once 
had); (4) testimonial injustice—where we do not count information gleaned from 
someone‘s testimony as knowledge without corroboration—corroboration achieved 
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by bending over backward to verify (or even undermine) that person‘s claims; (5) and 
finally, hermeneutical injustice—when a knower‘s ability to make meaning for 
herself is compromised. 
I want to take a moment to make clear these five epistemic harms, as they play 
a central role in my work: 
(1) Particular methods of pursuing knowledge are epistemically unsustainable. 
What I mean by this is that pursuing knowledge in a reckless or disrespectful 
way can close off that avenue for knowledge to those who may come after 
you, or even to yourself at a later time. This is in many ways similar to what is 
captured by the old adage of ―burning bridges,‖ but more specific in that the 
bridges we are interested in here are those that lead to the knowledge we are 
interested in. Collecting information in an epistemically unsustainable way, 
then, is epistemically harmful in that is limits our capacity for gaining 
additional knowledge in the future.  
(2) Certain information seeking practices are epistemically imperialistic. That 
is, they unduly privilege knowledge of a certain sort, and methods for 
achieving knowledge of a certain sort, over other available 
knowledge/methods. What is epistemically harmful in cases of epistemic 
imperialism is similar to what occurs in cases of epistemic unsustainability. 
Here, rather than burning bridges once we have crossed over them, we are 
choosing one bridge out of many, and burning the rest! Rather than limiting 
our access to knowledge in the future, we are limiting our access to 
knowledge we could have right now.  
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(3) An epistemic harm closely related to (2) is that of losing knowledge we 
once had by raising our standards of proof. Perhaps enticed by the promise of 
certain knowledge or unsettled by the presence of doubt, we may be 
persuaded to alter our standards of proof for knowledge. Where we once had 
knowledge, say, the knowledge that our partner was faithful, by raising the 
standards for what we are willing to count as evidence, we stand to lose that 
knowledge. Knowledge based on trust can be eliminated by requiring proof of 
a different sort—empirical, verifiable proof. Clearly, losing knowledge we 
once had is a case of epistemic harm.  
(4) Relentlessly pursuing knowledge can lead to an epistemic harm termed 
‗testimonial injustice‘ by Miranda Fricker (9). We do not count information 
gleaned from their testimony as knowledge without corroboration. When we 
bend over backward to verify (or perhaps undermine) claims made by an 
individual or a group of people, we subject them to testimonial injustice. 
Committing testimonial injustice is not merely epistemically harmful to the 
guilty party; testimonial injustice is likewise epistemically harmful to the 
victim.  
(5) Our final flavor of epistemic harm has similarly been identified and 
explored by Fricker: hermeneutical injustice (147). Hermeneutical injustice 
occurs when a knower‘s ability to create knowledge, to make meaning for 
herself, is compromised.  
After reviewing the epistemic harms and solutions in the conclusion to my project, I 
will suggest an account of wisdom that will help guide us through these types of 
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cases. I will spell out how a larger scale conception of posited solutions addresses the 
overarching problems while making it clear that there are implications of my findings 
outside questions in medicine and suggesting future directions this work could take. 
Philosophical Framework and Methodology 
My project will primarily be situated within the framework of feminist 
epistemology, but will also borrow from virtue epistemology. Briefly, then, let‘s tour 
the landscape of this discipline. Many virtue epistemologists maintain that the 
traditional questions in epistemology, and the traditional attempts at answers given, 
are too narrow to capture what ought to be epistemology‘s central focus. The proper 
focus of epistemology should, instead, be on the knower and her epistemic virtues, 
and on the community of that knower. It is this contention of virtue epistemology to 
which I am sympathetic, and why I think virtue epistemology is one proper 
framework for my project.  
I want to turn now to a discussion of some of the arguments being made in 
virtue and feminist epistemology which help to pave the way for my project. While 
what is presented here is merely a preview of how I intend to make my case, this 
discussion will give you a sense of how I intend to legitimize the questions I am 
asking, the way I go about answering them, and the proposed answers themselves. 
The first proposed avenue for my project comes from an essay entitled, ―Love 
and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Philosophy,‖ by Alison M. Jaggar. Though the 
thrust of her argument is somewhat ancillary to the project at hand, she, in several 
places, chides us for supposing that knowledge-seeking can be free from the influence 
of social values.  She writes, ―these values are implicit in the identification of the 
23 
 
problems that are considered worthy of investigation, in the selection of hypotheses 
that are considered worthy of testing, and in the solutions to the problems that are 
considered worthy of acceptance‖ (176). What is being suggested here is that, not 
only are our routes to acceptable answers to questions being set out for us (e.g. 
quantitative research, medical testing, etc.), more fundamentally and more 
frighteningly, so are the questions themselves! In line with this suggestion, then, it is 
time we carefully consider who set out the important questions to which we seek 
answers, and who decided how to answer them. If it turns out it wasn‘t us, then we 
ought to wonder what value the knowledge gained by pursuing these answers has for 
us, without, of course, presupposing it has any. And, in responding to this new, more 
fundamental question—why not look for some novelty in approach to our coming up 
with our answers? 
In seeking out this kind of novelty, we might be reminded of the quote at the 
opening of this work borrowed from Lorraine Code, ―…conditions that hold for any 
knower, regardless of her or his identity, interests, and circumstances, in other words 
of her or his subjectivity—could conceivably be discovered only for a narrow range 
of artificially isolated and purified empirical knowledge claims, which might be 
paradigmatic by fiat, but are unlikely so ‗in fact‘‖ (Code 191). In traditional 
epistemology, Code believes that only a narrow subset of human knowledge claims 
can be isolated and analyzed by an epistemology which does not attend to the 
subjectivity of the knower.  
So what kind of analysis is required to capture the natural kinds of human 
knowledge with which Code is concerned? In her answer to this question, I believe, 
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we can find justification for my approach to answering the questions with which I am 
concerned. It is Code‘s contention that, ―the ideal objectivity of the universal knower 
is neither possible nor desirable, a realistic commitment to achieving empirical 
adequacy that engages in situated analyses of the subjectivities of both the knower 
and (where appropriate) the known is both desirable and possible…Objectivity 
requires taking subjectivity into account‖ (206). So, for a proper inquiry to be such, it 
must consider the subjectivity of what is known and who is knowing it. Paying 
careful attention to these factors, then, can likely be seen as a candidate for an 
approach to answering our questions about the value of knowledge, as well as hint at 
the kind of answers we might expect.  
In an essay entitled, ―On Judging Epistemic Credibility,‖ from Linda Martín 
Alcoff we hear another call to this kind of approach (in fact, one that pushes us a bit 
further). She writes,  
Because experience is an event involving intentionality – involving the whole of 
one‘s life – a similar event may be experienced very differently by different persons. 
The interpretive process itself is both individual and social: the effort to establish 
meaning is performed by the individual, and subject to modification upon her critical 
reflectiveness, but is always conditioned by the concepts, narratives, values, and 
meanings that are available in her social and discursive context. (256) 
 
Code and Alcoff, then, have added to our repertoire considerations regarding 
the historical, political, racial, financial, etc., situatedness of the knower, the 
community of knowers, and the objects of knowledge. They urge us to push past 
artificially simplistic epistemologies which advocate the possibility and 
representativeness of the fabled ―view from nowhere.‖ In line with the suggestions of 
Code and Alcoff, I intend to use what I find to be the approach best suited to 
addressing issues of the situatedness of the knower: the narrative approach. 
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An alternative way of looking at my project is to cast it in terms of the value 
of ignorance rather than the disvalue of knowledge. Cynthia Townley explores this 
approach in her article, ―Towards a Reevaluation of Ignorance.‖ She writes,  
Some ignorance should be remedied; some ignorance is harmful. But, in other ways, 
some ignorance contributes positively to epistemic responsibility and a lack of 
knowledge is not necessarily an epistemic flaw. Unless the positive role of ignorance 
is recognized, the full field of epistemic responsibility is obscured. Ignorance is 
theoretically necessary and practically valuable for certain epistemic projects 
precisely because knowledge does not exhaust the domain of epistemic value: 
epistemic agency involves more than knowledge collection. (38) 
 
This, then, is an example of one of the few thinkers who may be sympathetic to my 
cause. We need to make room for considerations over and above, or at least in 
addition to, that of knowledge when talking about what is epistemically valuable. 
Townley thinks that there ought to be room for knowledge‘s antithesis—ignorance—
in the things we take to be epistemically valuable. I enthusiastically agree. We will 
argue this point head on, by investigating the epistemic risks of certain forms of 
knowledge seeking behavior and subsequent knowledge gained; we will argue this 
point contextually, through narrative explorations of cases illustrating the highly 
relevant situated features of the knowers and objects of knowledge, and, finally, we 
will even argue this point upside-down and backwards, exploring the peculiar value 
of ignorance, both instrumental and intrinsic, as Townley and others do, and finding a 
rightful place for it in conversation of what counts as epistemically valuable.  
In closing, I would like to explore a central assumption made by virtue 
epistemology, one that provided some incentive for my project. Again, I am highly 
sympathetic to the contention of virtue epistemology that the traditional questions in 
epistemology, and the traditional attempts at answers given, are too narrow to capture 
what ought to be epistemology‘s central focus. Moreover, I agree that the proper 
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focus of epistemology should instead be on the knower and her epistemic virtues, and 
on the community of that knower. For these reasons I have identified virtue 
epistemology as a useful framework in which to situate my project and, as discussed 
above, and intend to adopt many of its methodological approaches. Virtue 
epistemology, however, can also be regarded as something of an impetus for this 
project. Although not alone in doing it, virtue epistemology makes a move similar to 
the kind I hope to warn against in this project.  
As noted above, virtue epistemologists themselves operate with something of 
a pretheoretic assumption about the value of knowledge. Inquiry concerning the value 
of knowledge in VE and elsewhere centers around attempts at singling out the 
peculiar value of knowledge over and above mere true belief (a fact which suggests 
that there is some presupposed value for which they are making a case). How this 
value can be said to be attributed to knowledge largely focuses on the route taken to 
achieving it. For virtue epistemologists, the answer lies in determining whether it was 
the subject‘s intellectual virtues that led him or her to said knowledge.  
However, it is the presumed value of knowledge which many virtue 
epistemologists rely on in conceiving of epistemic virtues as such. What makes 
epistemic virtues epistemic in virtue epistemology is that they are guided by a 
motivation for knowledge. What makes them virtues is that this motivation for 
knowledge is (presumably) a good one. Hints of circular reasoning notwithstanding, 
for our purposes we will have to take issue with both of these contentions in arriving 
at a solution for the problems posed by our questions regarding the decision to know.  
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The motivation for knowledge, when poised to bring about certain epistemic 
harms and risks, cannot be haphazardly supposed to be a good one.  Questioning the 
value of knowledge has the potential to undermine many of the projects in virtue 
epistemology. It is not my intention to undermine these projects, but it is my intention 
to subject several of their fundamental assumptions to some overdue scrutiny.  What I 
hope to show is that the motivation required for a second-order epistemic virtue like 
wisdom is one that is much wider than the motivation for knowledge—one that can 
take into consideration potential epistemic harms for the knower and the known.  
One thing that unites the cases explored in Chapters 2-4 is the way in which 
the relationships involved are threatened by epistemophilia. Whether it is a woman 
and her child, her lover, her boss, or herself, proper concern and care for these 
relationships requires a willingness to accept some level of ignorance. Harm to a 
relationship is not, by itself, epistemically harmful. However, knowing is not just 
something that we do, knowing is something we do tangled up with all of the other 
things we do and the other people that we do them with. Attention to this fact reveals 
the many ways in which knowledge and the pursuit of knowledge can be 
epistemically harmful to both the knower and the known. Committing or being a 
victim of testimonial or hermeneutical injustice, unduly privileging certain knowledge 
and practices of achieving it over others, violating the epistemic agency of another, 
and not recognizing and appreciating ignorance where it is appropriate all constitute 
epistemic harms, and our knowledge seeking practices need to be aimed at avoiding 
them where possible. It is my contention that doing so constitutes an epistemic virtue 
and, in the conclusion of this work, that is what I hope to establish.
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Chapter Two: Knowledge Acquisition and the Escalation of Intervention in 
Pregnancy 
 
Much has been done in recent years both to highlight and combat the use of 
intervention procedures during normal, low-risk labors, including an upsurge in the 
promotion and utilization of natural or alternative pain management techniques, as 
well as the increased availability of birthing centers and accredited midwifery. A 
central concern with the use of intervention in childbirth is termed ‗the escalation of 
intervention,‘ when one intervention strategy ultimately leads to another, and another, 
and so on. For example, the apparently innocuous use of an epidural for pain 
management in labor has the ability to slow down and even cease natural labor, which 
ultimately leads doctors to pursue other strategies, such as Pitocin, breaking of the 
waters and, in more extreme instances, even cesarean delivery.  
Much less attention has been paid, however, to how the same concept, the 
escalation of intervention, applies to medical intervention (here broadly construed as 
both prenatal testing and procedures) prior to labor and delivery. For example, a 
seemingly harmless and ordinary twenty-week ultrasound can lead to further, more 
invasive, genetic testing; amniocentesis; increased monitoring of the pregnancy; and  
early delivery. In this chapter I will investigate how the same concept of escalation of 
intervention in labor maps onto medical intervention in pregnancy through a narrative 
exploration of how one healthy pregnancy was inaccurately deemed high-risk. 
Attention to the narrative, and to the escalation of intervention in pregnancy in 
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general, will raise two epistemological concerns: first, I will explore questions about 
the value and perhaps unwarranted privilege of certain kinds of knowledge over 
others, and whether it is always better to have such knowledge, second, I will address 
questions about how epistemic authority is distributed between pregnant women and 
their healthcare providers and how this distribution impacts the value we place on 
certain types of knowledge.  
I will argue that epistemic authority is given to the physician and 
biomedical/scientific ways of knowing in pregnancy and that such knowledge is 
given unwarranted privilege not just in the medical community, but by society at 
large. This privilege and priority serves to epistemically undermine women and their 
knowledge and control over their own pregnancies.   
One relatively unnecessary and relatively unquestioned procedure that has 
become quite commonplace in prenatal care is that of the twenty-week ultrasound. 
While frequently assumed by women and families to be an exciting opportunity to 
―meet‖ baby, the procedure itself is actually a sophisticated test for a number of 
congenital or genetic abnormalities. Only women who are at elevated risk for certain 
conditions detectable through ultrasound need this exam. Yet it is almost universally 
offered in the United States, even to women who choose midwifery as a less-
medicalized route for care during their pregnancies.  
As I watched the screen breathlessly during the exam trying to discern the 
different body parts recognizable to me, the narration from the ultrasound technician 
slowly tapered which, at first, went unnoticed, until finally the room was silent with 
the exception of deafening mouse clicks freezing and unfreezing images on the 
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screen. I looked from the screen, to my partner, to the technician and back again, 
reading appropriate worry from each. Finally, the technician excused herself to 
summon the doctor. The doctor, one I had not yet met, took his position at the 
machine and ran the wand over and along my swollen abdomen, without a single 
word. He shut off the machine and began, ―well, here is what concerns us…‖ 
My ordinary level-three ultrasound had revealed three markers of Down 
syndrome. The markers detected included a thick nuchal fold, an echogenic bowel, 
and choroid plexus cysts, all of which were conditions that I had never even heard of. 
I was told that, alone, these markers didn‘t indicate any problem with my baby, but 
together, they increased the likelihood quite dramatically that the baby would be born 
with Down syndrome. Because I was so young, I had not elected to do any of the 
screening tests for genetic defects earlier in the pregnancy, but now, I was urged once 
more to have my blood drawn in order to discern the likelihood of Down syndrome 
from yet another measure. I hastily agreed. I quickly submitted to taking tests I had 
intentionally chosen not to just weeks prior. My reasoning not to take the tests 
initially had been quite simple: it was more likely I would find out I was at elevated 
risk for a condition than it was that the baby actually had it. I simply didn‘t want to 
worry. Before I knew it I was in the car on the way home wondering what to tell my 
friends and family—who to tell, even. 
The twenty week ultrasound has become an assumed, if not required, 
diagnostic test in pregnancy. It is used to detect structural abnormalities of the fetus, 
the position of the placenta, and a myriad of other details about the pregnancy that are 
not discernable from the exterior of a woman‘s womb or by direct report from the 
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woman herself. They have been, for the most part, embraced by women as a chance 
to have a visual manifestation of their fetus, even in uncomplicated pregnancies. They 
are performed at twenty weeks, late enough so that measures of fetal growth and 
placental position are at least moderately relevant for projections of how the 
remainder of the pregnancy and labor will go, and early enough so that if 
abnormalities are indeed detected, something can still be done about them. Here, the 
expression ‗to do something‘ means, almost always, to do further testing on the 
mother and the fetus, and, in some cases, to actually perform surgery on the fetus, 
prepare for surgery after birth, prepare the family for raising a child with a disability, 
or to terminate the pregnancy. A twenty-week ultrasound is generally not described to 
an expectant mother in this way, however.  
The desire to know certain things about the baby (e.g., his or her sex) has 
relegated questions about the value of that knowledge to the backseat. The questions 
women could be asking of the pregnancy regarding the epistemic and ordinary aims 
of at their prenatal care include: what exactly am I looking for with this procedure, 
and what are my options if something abnormal is found? Here the problem may be 
that, while the physicians are not exactly pulling the wool over the eyes of mothers, 
they have neglected to inform them of the emotional and epistemic risks involved in 
the procedure, or to have urged them to consider whether these risks are meaningful 
to them. This indicates disregard for the epistemic status of pregnant women by 
physicians and medical norms. These are questions that need asking prior to this type 
of epistemic behavior, as a matter of appropriate reflection on our epistemic 
tendencies. Yet if women elect not to pursue an ultrasound for these reasons, partners 
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and other family members may still influence them to do so because it enriches their 
experience of the pregnancy.  
There are a number of general worries about the use of ultrasound technology 
in pregnancy worth exploring. These worries concern what it does to our ideas about 
the mother and the fetus, as well as what it does to the budding relationship between 
mother and baby. Ultrasounds turn the mother into something to be looked through in 
order to access information about the fetus. Ultrasound technology works by making 
the mother invisible in order to come to know things about the fetus. This fact 
subsequently results in an understanding of the fetus as extractable from, or 
independent of, the mother—a serious ontological error. Depicting fetuses themselves 
as somehow isolatable from the context in or conditions under which they live is 
understandably troubling and not only influences the relationship a mother has to her 
unborn child, but likewise has impacted the way individuals standing on the outside 
of the pregnancy come to understand pregnancy and the fetus in general. Women can 
begin to consider the experience of seeing their fetus on the screen as somehow more 
enlightening, more personal, more meaningful, more real than the ordinary 
experiences of pregnancy—such as quickening—the experiences only available to 
her.  
Here there is a real worry about potentially undermining a woman‘s special 
access—special knowledge—she has to the pregnancy as the sole person actually 
experiencing the being pregnant. There are many things that are available only to the 
woman, or via a direct examination of her, or through her own report; for example, 
the activity or movement of the fetus can be felt by the woman as early as sixteen 
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weeks gestation. Additionally, the position of the fetus in the womb can be detected 
by manual manipulation of the exterior of a woman‘s abdomen or even through her 
own sensation (and here it is worth noting a potentially helpful role for experts: by 
helping her interpret her sensations). How engaged the fetus is in (how far its head 
has dropped into) the pelvis can be determined externally as well, which is a useful 
indicator of the commencement of labor. Fetal growth can be measured by the height 
of the fundus.  
For all of these reasons, ultrasounds used to merely determine the position or 
patterns of movement of the fetus in a healthy pregnancy are easily replaceable by the 
verbal reports from and direct examination of the person who is in the best position to 
know these things, the person carrying the baby inside of them. When an ultrasound 
is used to detect abnormalities in the fetus what serves to replace the pregnant woman 
is probabilistic information about risk. One might argue, then, that ultrasound use 
generates knowledge that is preferable to probabilities. Yet ultrasounds themselves 
are imprecise and so too only give us probabilities. Their indications are not exact and 
even in the most seemingly obvious instances there is still room to err.  
 A quotation from Barbara Katz-Rothman serves to jumpstart our analysis of 
the epistemic role of this medical technique: 
The doctor sits between mother and fetus. He turns away from the mother to examine 
the baby. Even the heartbeat is heard over a speaker removed from the woman‘s 
body. The technology that makes the baby/fetus more ―visible‖ renders the woman 
invisible…The direct relationship to the baby within them, the fetus as part of their 
bodies, is superseded by the relationship with the fetus on the screen. The television 
image becomes more real than the fetus within; it is that image to which they 
―bond‖; it is that image they hold in their minds as they feel their babies move. 
(―Tentative Pregnancy‖ 113) 
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The way in which an ultrasound can be interpreted as a bonding experience, 
the way it is traditionally interpreted, is quite baffling when viewed in this light. In a 
sense, the child has never been further away from its mother than it is at the moment 
of an ultrasound. More rightly, the ultrasound ought to be viewed as a bonding 
experience for family members or friends other than the mother, the people who do 
not get to experience such a direct relationship with the new baby. This is a potential 
explanation as to why ultrasounds are depicted as unprecedented opportunities to 
bond with baby: because they are so for fathers. The knowledge gained through 
ultrasound use when no complications arise, can replace the ―knowledge‖ women had 
prior. What is meant by knowledge here is perhaps something more like ―conception‖ 
or ―image.‖ The terminology exchange functions as something more than a semantic 
game. Imagery and individual conceptions ought to be considered epistemic goods in 
their own right and something independent is lost when these images and conceptions 
are so readily replaced by what is generated by an ultrasound machine and deemed 
―knowledge.‖ 
The worries raised by ultrasound use in pregnancy directly related to our 
present discussion are twofold: first, ultrasounds have become so commonplace they 
are virtually unquestioned by mothers and health care personnel. Rarely do women 
elect not to have ultrasounds, and when they do, they are often faced with opposition 
by their doctors, midwives, fathers and other family members. In all of the 
pregnancies and labors that turn out to be uncomplicated, these ultrasounds are 
unnecessary. Of course it is impossible to know beforehand that an ultrasound 
examination will turn out to be unnecessary; however, the choice of whether or not to 
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perform one should always be left up to the mother in the form of an overt and 
explicit decision, not just in having the (unknown) right to refuse the procedure.  
Giving her critical information about the epistemic risks of routine ultrasound 
use validates the authority a woman has to make decisions about her own body, her 
own pregnancy, and her own epistemic standing, by allowing her the opportunity to 
consider how valuable the probabilistic data gleaned from ultrasound use about the 
fetus and the pregnancy is to her. Denying her the opportunity to make an overt 
decision about whether or not to have an ultrasound unduly privileges the kind of 
knowledge available through this technology and, in so doing, indefensibly elevates 
the epistemic importance and presumed superiority of empirical, biomedical data. 
The second worry relevant to our main concern is that ultrasound technology, 
though highly advanced, is not a diagnostic tool; it is merely investigative. Thus, if an 
ultrasound reveals something unusual, the only course of action indicated is to do 
more. This was the case in my own experience: because the twenty-week ultrasound 
indicated a likelihood of Down syndrome, the next step was to determine whether or 
not the baby was indeed suffering from the condition with some higher degree of 
certainty (although still not with absolute certainty). The only way to determine this 
was via amniocentesis. After scheduling both the amniocentesis and a meeting with a 
genetic counselor, I came home to a freshly painted nursery, a box containing a crib I 
intended to build that weekend, a baby name book. I decided not to talk names. I 
decided not to put together the crib. I decided to tell people about the amniocentesis, 
and, if the test came back positive for Down syndrome and I decided to abort, that I 
would tell my friends and family that I miscarried as a result of the amniocentesis. 
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―Seeking and waiting for information changes the pre-information stage of 
pregnancy, creates what I think of as a ―tentative pregnancy.‖ it incorporates the issue 
of abortion right into the route to motherhood and institutionalizes the conditionality 
in motherly love‖ (Rothman, ―Tentative Pregnancy‖ 85). 
The talk of abortion, though, was introduced by the doctor who spoke with me 
right after my ultrasound. She came in to explain the findings of the doctor who 
oversaw my ultrasound. Terminating the pregnancy hadn‘t even crossed my mind 
until she indicated it as an option for dealing with a positive result from the 
amniocentesis, saying ―we can take care of that for you too.‖  
My life was immediately put on hold. All of my planning, all of my 
excitement soured. I went from talking about ―when the baby comes‖ to ―if the baby 
comes.‖ I went from collecting items for the baby to collecting receipts for the items I 
already had. I went from worrying about diaper changes to worrying about changing 
diapers for the entirety of my child‘s life. This expectant, paused state of being is 
precisely what Rothman means by the tentative pregnancy. Rothman believes that the 
practice of amniocentesis for genetic screening puts mothers and families into a 
detached and weary relationship with their developing fetus; a relationship 
characterized by a sense of unease and uncertainty. This kind of relationship can 
cause a woman to experience some of the most exciting happenings of a pregnancy, 
such as the fetus‘s first felt kick, with anxiety and stress—a way markedly different 
from the way women not waiting for results from an amniocentesis to come in 
experience these events (―Tentative Pregnancy‖ 85). 
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The decision to have amniocentesis and the related (but not fated) decision of 
whether or not to terminate the pregnancy if the results were positive collapsed onto 
one another for me. I barely thought about the amniocentesis. It never occurred to me 
to consider turning down an invasive, risky, and painful procedure, even after my 
blood tests returned indicating a much lower chance of any problems with the baby. 
There was, however, no question for me. Similarly, there was seemingly no question 
for the doctors or the genetic counselors we spoke with. I would have the test done. 
The urgent and obvious nature of the affirmative answer to the question of whether or 
not to have further testing is indicative of the way in which a compulsion toward 
knowledge has influenced the medical management of pregnancy. The question of the 
value of knowing versus not knowing information about a pregnancy that is available 
through medical means is, in many ways, assumed to be answered by the medical 
establishment, and, predictably, answered in favor of the value of that knowledge. 
The issue of the presupposed value of medical knowledge to in our discussion will be 
returned to at the close of the chapter. 
When I finally began to separate out the questions about amniocentesis and 
termination and more intentionally turn to the latter, it seemed, to others, as though 
that decision, too, was an obvious one. To my partner, to my sister, to my mother, the 
event of a positive result was the same as a positive answer to the question of whether 
the pregnancy should be terminated. I had (excitedly) considered the fetus to be ―the 
baby‖ up to that point. Suddenly, I was back to talking about ―the pregnancy‖ instead 
of the baby—the language used prior to conception.  I began to portray my 
experiences in light of this new way of talking, this new information. Rothman writes, 
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―The problem, or one of the problems, with the technology of amniocentesis and 
selective abortion is what it does to us, to mothers and to fathers and to families. It 
sets up a contradiction in definitions. It asks women to accept their pregnancies and 
their babies, to take care of the babies within them, and yet be willing to abort them‖ 
(―Tentative Pregnancy‖ 6).  
For me, the genetic counseling and the amniocentesis coincided. I met with 
the genetic counselor who took a family history (Down syndrome is not hereditary) 
and advised me to have the amniocentesis. Ultrasound is used while performing 
amniocentesis so the doctor can discern the best place to insert the needle and draw 
fluid with respect to the position of the baby and the placenta. The doctor chose, in 
my case, to push the needle directly through the placenta to draw fluid. This decision 
made the procedure more difficult and more risky. During the procedure, I watched 
the baby squirm and wriggle on the television screen. I watched the needle penetrate 
her sanctuary. They finished the procedure by switching the machine to its three 
dimensional mode and printing a picture of the baby—or not. They told me it was a 
girl. Following the amniocentesis, the doctor recommended that I schedule a 
subsequent ultrasound to discern whether or not the choroid plexus cysts had resolved 
themselves. Several days later, I received a phone call from the genetic counselor. 
The baby did not have Down syndrome nor any of the other genetic abnormalities 
detectable from the tests involving amniotic fluid. That evening, a name was chosen 
for my baby girl.  
At six months gestation, I came back in for the ultrasound to determine 
whether the choroid plexus cysts had resolved themselves. They had. The ultrasound 
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technician, however, light-heartedly mentioned that the placenta looked ―sparkly,‖ by 
which she meant that the placenta appeared to be calcifying, or dying, more rapidly 
than it should be. The placenta, normally depicted as fairly dark on the ultrasound 
screen, was adorned with a coat of little white flecks, indicative of advancing 
gestational age. At my appointment with the obstetrician (the same obstetrician who 
introduced the language of termination several weeks previous), just after my 
ultrasound, the tone changed. I was urged to schedule weekly biophysical profiles and 
told that it was likely that they would need to deliver the baby early, since the ageing 
placenta was not going to sustain her for the duration of the pregnancy.  
My pregnancy had turned from something joyful and exciting (albeit 
nauseating), to something anxiety-ridden and disheartening. Every week, for two 
months, I rode two busses to get to the doctor‘s office, careful not to exert myself too 
much for fear of depriving the baby of oxygen, careful not to slip and fall on the 
December ice, to lie down on the table in the ultrasound exam room and watch my 
baby kick and squirm, swallow and expel the fluid that surrounded her. Every week 
the placenta, to them, appeared worse and worse. Every week it took a little longer for 
her to achieve all of the tasks she was meant to accomplish in the allotted 30 minute 
period. Every week I left feeling more anxious, more fearful, that something would 
happen to her without my knowing it. I wanted to constantly be able to watch her on 
the screen. I wanted assurance that she wouldn‘t slip away from us in the days 
between my visits. Eventually, I got just that. The doctors decided that weekly exams 
were not sufficient, and asked me to begin coming in twice a week. The only time I 
felt reassured that she was indeed alive and well is when they told me so. Every time I 
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felt her squirming or kicking I worried it was too frequent or too far between, as both 
were indicative of a problem.  
My body had turned into a treacherous place for a baby. It was as if, while I 
was alone with her, she was constantly in grave danger. The mere status of being 
inside of me put her unnecessarily at risk. She was only safe while being observed by 
the doctors, by individuals who could interpret her actions and translate them back to 
me. I was told that passing a biophysical profile was ―good for 48 hours‖ meaning 
that no harm would be expected in the 48 hours following one of these exams. This, 
of course, felt as absurd as it sounds—but I was reassured again and again that it was 
so.  
In the last few weeks of my pregnancy the weather turned very cold. I was 
happy for the excuse to curl up on the couch and closely monitor the baby‘s routine in 
my belly. I ventured out only for groceries (lots of them) and doctor‘s visits (lots of 
those, too). Finally the doctors decided that we should ―come up with a plan‖ for her 
arrival. I was told that having one would relieve my anxiety, a complaint I was naive 
enough to mention when the doctor uncharacteristically asked me how I was doing. 
The plan they came up with was to do a second amniocentesis to test for lung 
maturity at thirty-six weeks gestation and, in the event that the results indicated 
maturity, to induce labor. The appointments were scheduled and, in a way, doing so 
did indeed alleviate some of my worries. I had an endpoint in sight. I only had to keep 
her alive for a few more weeks and, once she was out of me, she would be safe in the 
doctor’s arms. I started worrying about lung maturity rates and induction procedures. 
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I read up on premature babies, crossing potential hazards off my list as the pregnancy 
extended into thirty-four weeks, thirty-five, thirty-six.  
But are women enemies of fetuses? Women, in fact, do not refuse such procedures 
nearly as often as they should…for most women, in the course of a wanted 
pregnancy, the fetus becomes real, precious, treasured. The overwhelming majority 
of women accept gratefully the cesarean sections their doctors offer—believing that 
it is best for the baby, even when the current data show quite clearly that probably 
three out of four cesarean sections in America are not necessary. (Rothman, 
―Recreating Motherhood‖ 167) 
 
The day of my scheduled amniocentesis and potential induction finally 
arrived. The ultrasound technician completed one final biophysical profile and printed 
out Carlin‘s last ultrasound photo, a barely visible profile of her giant foot. At this 
point, we had about thirty of them. My experiences of the moments leading up to her 
birth were so different from what I had imagined a mere eight months previously. The 
doctor entered the room and began setting up for the amniocentesis. Because I had 
had one before, I started to worry about the pain of the procedure. Then I started to 
worry about the pain of childbirth.  
Amniocentesis is considered to be more risky to a pregnancy earlier on. An 
amniocentesis is rarely done prior to twenty weeks because at any time sooner, a 
sufficient volume of amniotic fluid is not available to draw in order to run tests 
without risk to the pregnancy. The primary risk from amniocentesis is not, as you 
might expect, damage to the fetus but, instead, the induction of labor. The later into 
the pregnancy an amniocentesis is performed, the more likely it is that the fetus will 
survive if labor is triggered. At thirty-six weeks the risk of inducing labor was not as 
serious as it had been at twenty weeks. For this reason we moved on without 
hesitation.  
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Again, because of its prominent position, the doctor decided to go through the 
placenta to draw fluid. After several minutes of trying, the doctor removed the needle 
from my belly and I finally glanced back up at the screen. A rush of fluid was visible 
to me and, as the doctor hastily edged out of the room, I asked the ultrasound 
technician what I was seeing. ―Blood,‖ she answered, and through the doorway we 
heard the doctor‘s voice over the phone ordering a stat cesarean section. The needle 
had ruptured the placenta, and my blood was rushing into the amniotic sac. The 
doctor returned to the room, along with a nurse and a wheelchair, hurriedly 
explaining what had happened, and that the baby needed to be delivered urgently.  
As I was rushed through the hallways connecting the office building and the 
hospital, for the first time in several months I felt inexplicably tranquil. Here, the life 
of my baby was acutely at risk by the hand of my own physician and, instead of 
feelings of fear, I was entertaining a sense of relief. I knew that, in a matter of 
moments, she would be safely in the world—no longer in a constant state of peril.  
Because of the damage done to the placenta, there was no hope of natural 
birth, nor even induced labor. Instead, preparations were made for an emergency 
cesarean delivery. Rothman writes, 
Cesarean section is one of the most common operations performed on women, but it 
is rarely done to save the life or the health of the mother. Much more commonly it is 
done in response to fetal indications because obstetricians, rightly or wrongly, 
believe that the laboring uterus is potentially dangerous to the fetus. (―Recreating 
Motherhood‖ 167) 
 
In my own case, it was not made at all clear to me how medically necessary 
the operation truly was. I had read about, and heard about, the procedure but was 
completely unprepared for what came next. After donning the smock and enduring a 
humiliating shave from my nurse I was separated from my family. I walked into the 
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operating room, trembling. The room was bright, windowless, and cold. I sat on the 
bed and leaned forward so they could administer the anesthesia into my spine. As I 
started to become numb I was situated into a supine position with the lower half of 
my body completely exposed to everyone in the room but myself—a sheet erected to 
further separate me from what was going on to create a sterile field. My arms were 
strapped down and I could feel nothing but cold, the cold of the air on my skin, the 
cold of the anesthesia working its way up my waist, the cold of the saline winding its 
way through my veins. I wondered if the baby was cold too. Adrienne Rich writes, 
―…but women are now asking what psychic effect a state of semihelplessness has on 
a healthy mother, awake during the birth, yet prevented from participating actively in 
delivery. No more devastating image could be invented for the bondage of woman: 
sheeted, supine, drugged, her wrists strapped down and her legs in stirrups, at the 
very moment when she is bringing new life into the world.‖ (170-171) 
 
They started cutting. I couldn‘t feel the cuts, but I could feel the pressure. I 
could tell they were doing something to me. I could tell they were doing things to me 
I would not be okay with if I could witness it. I watched the clock; I prayed that they 
would slow down. I started to cry. The anesthesiologist said he would give me 
something to calm me down. They delivered my baby and, after weighing, washing, 
and drying her, they showed her to me then quickly took her away to be monitored. A 
few minutes later, they called to me from the other side of the sheet and declared 
about my placenta: ―it looks good—except for the abruption!‖  
In another depiction of delivery, this time of a vaginal delivery, I find echoes 
of these same horrifying descriptions of women no longer in control of what is 
happening to their bodies: 
certainly a woman who was unconscious, semistupefied, amnesiac, or simply numb 
from the waist down cannot have experienced giving birth as an accomplishment, 
something over which she had no control. But what of the woman who is encouraged 
in childbirth-preparation classes to see herself as a member of a ―team‖ delivering 
44 
 
her baby? Though she may help and watch in a mirror, she is not the primary actor. 
Positioning and draping her in such a way that she cannot directly see the birth, not 
allowing her to touch her genitals or the forthcoming baby, tells the mother that the 
birth is something that is happening to her or being done to her, not something she 
herself is doing. The birth is managed, conducted, by the other members of the team, 
those who are telling her what to do, and physically manipulating her and her baby. 
(Rothman ―Giving Birth‖ 177) 
 
There was something fitting in the fact that Carlin‘s birth had little or nothing 
to do with me. I was neither an active participant, nor particularly informed about 
what was going on. From the moment that I had my twenty week ultrasound until the 
moment I was released from the hospital, Carlin was cared for and managed by 
someone other than me. Her first thirty-six hours in this world were characterized by 
the dim lights and constant beeping of the NICU, difficult IV placements and a 
delirious mom hovering over her plastic container. Diapers were changed and 
weighed by nurses, food was administered intravenously. She was finally released to 
my care only to be hovered over and eventually removed from my room on account 
of ―low body temperature.‖ Later I was told by our pediatrician that the best remedy 
for low body temperature in a newborn is skin-to-skin contact with the mother, not 
the warming lamps they lay infants, like french-fries, underneath.  Breastfeeding 
sessions were observed and critiqued by lactation consultants. When we were finally 
released from the hospital, 24 hours passed in a dreamlike haze before Carlin was 
readmitted to children‘s hospital on account of complications stemming from her 
premature birth and the ingestion of my blood which resulted from the ruptured 
placenta. Even after being taken from me, delivered to supposed safety, antibodies 
from my blood that had entered her blood stream were attacking her and preventing 
her from thriving. I was endangering her from a distance, even.  
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She spent the next month in a world she shouldn‘t yet have been in, losing 
weight, suffering from jaundice, having her heels poked, with a medicated mom 
recovering from a surgery she needn‘t have been subjected to. Carlin‘s premature 
delivery and difficult first month in the world were the direct result of an over-
managed pregnancy—a pregnancy characterized by fear and anxiety, observation and 
intervention, and the undermining of the confidence of a mother and the developing 
relationship between mother and child.  
To reiterate the way in which this story can be adequately understood through 
the framework of the escalation of intervention in pregnancy, all we need to do is 
briefly recount how each intervention procedure was necessitated by the one prior. 
Carlin‘s tenure in the NICU was necessitated by her premature delivery. Her 
premature delivery took the shape of an emergency cesarean section which was the 
course of events dictated by the placental abruption caused by an amniocentesis to 
check for lung maturity at thirty-six weeks. The amniocentesis for lung maturity was 
the decided endpoint for a series of biophysical profiles occurring weekly, and then 
increasing in frequency to twice a week. The biophysical profiles were ordered after 
the detection of calcification of the placenta during an ultrasound to check for the 
resolution of choroid plexus cysts. That ultrasound was ordered following an 
amniocentesis to test for genetic defects—genetic defects which were suspected based 
on the markers detected during the ordinary, albeit unnecessary twenty-week 
ultrasound.  
While it is acknowledged that hindsight is always twenty-twenty, it should be 
pointed out that the only test that would have revealed a problem with Carlin was the 
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botched amniocentesis at thirty-six weeks to test for lung maturity. No amniotic fluid 
was successfully drawn during the procedure, but the placental abruption caused by it 
necessitated an early delivery regardless of whether or not her tiny lungs were 
prepared to take in air. This abruption, recall, was the only problem they noted with 
the placenta following delivery. That is, there was no evidence of premature placental 
ageing, or any other condition that could have caused harm to the baby. What did end 
up causing a problem for her was the presence of my blood in the amniotic fluid, 
blood that was introduced as a result of the unsuccessful amniocentesis.  
What really struck me as I gazed down at my average sized infant—the giant 
of the NICU—was that she was the product of a completely healthy pregnancy. The 
only reasons I could come up with to explain the tubes and monitors coming off her 
had nothing to do with me. Acknowledging this fact, standing in stark contrast to 
everything I had been told and everything I felt up to that point, immediately relieved 
the cognitive dissonance built up inside me by wanting so badly to take care of my 
daughter and yet believing that I was putting her in danger just by having her inside 
of me.  
I want to briefly make the case of how the concept of ―escalation of 
intervention‖ can be used in pregnancy just as it is in labor and delivery. Recognition 
of the risk of an escalation of intervention during labor and delivery is relatively 
uncontested. Examples of how this story can go include the use of epidurals which 
can slow down the rate of natural contractions, oftentimes resulting in the use of labor 
medicine to speed up or re-start labor, or that being made to lie on a hospital bed in 
the supine position reduces the efficacy of contractions and can lead to the use of 
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forceps or vacuum extractors to assist in the birth of the child. One intervention 
strategy, in particular, exemplifies how the escalation occurs: 
the artificial induction and stimulation of labor, widely resorted to in the United 
States, produces longer, stronger contractions with less relaxation span between them 
than the contractions of normal labor. This in turn leads to the use of pain-relieving 
drugs; as so often, medical technology creates its own artificial problem for which an 
artificial remedy must be found. These unnaturally strong and lengthy contractions 
can deprive the fetus of oxygen, while the analgesic drugs interfere with its 
respiration [after delivery]. If labor in the United States were induced only in cases 
of medical necessity, only about 3 percent of births would be induced (Rich, 178). 
 
The successful mapping of the kinds of cause and effect relationships 
characteristic of the escalation of intervention in labor and childbirth onto the case of 
pregnancy indicates that the concept applies to issues of pregnancy as well. One 
worry that might be raised here is that the real issue in both of these cases is not a 
genuine escalation of intervention; instead, it is the mere medicalization of pregnancy 
and childbirth that is troublesome. I hope it is clear from the narrative example, as 
well as from the quotation from Rich that there is something more menacing at work 
here than the simple fact that pregnancy and childbirth have been infiltrated by the 
medical institution and have become considered conditions requiring treatment. The 
depravity of this understanding of pregnancy and childbirth is not being denied here; 
however, it is not my purpose to argue that medical intervention is malum in se.  
In childbirth, aside from the techniques used to speed up or render labor 
painless, there are also a number of monitoring technologies in common use, and 
these raise the sorts of specifically epistemic concerns that are my focus. Fetal 
monitors, for example, are commonly used in hospitals to detect the heart rate of the 
fetus during contractions. They are a fairly new and now increasingly frequently if 
not universally used during delivery at hospitals or birthing centers. As the use of 
fetal monitoring has increased, coincidentally, so has the instance of emergency 
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cesarean delivery. So here we have an example of the kinds of technologies that we 
use to answer some of the questions we have about the state of a pregnancy or the 
status of a fetus during labor. Yet, the accuracy of the answers provided by these 
mechanisms are undeniably in question. Fetal monitoring has the potential impact of 
raising concerns about the status of the fetus during labor and delivery when none are 
necessary and, therefore, can initiate undue intervention in the process of labor. 
Similarly, as we have seen in our narrative example, an ultrasound might wrongly 
indicate concerns about the intrauterine environment (e.g. a prematurely ageing 
placenta), pressuring doctors to deliver the baby ―to safety.‖  
Even if we bracket the possibility for the kind of harm set in motion by these 
information-seeking techniques suggested above, the question arises as to whether 
harm can come from the mere information seeking in the first place. In other words, if 
we grant the possibility that procedures like screening for abnormalities of the fetus 
with ultrasound were 100% accurate in predicting problems, would there still be a 
concern about the use of ultrasound, the asking of these kinds of questions, in the first 
place? 
In order to get clearer about this question, we will begin looking at an 
example drawn from a different area of medicine to making the case for the 
applicability of the notion of escalation of intervention to intervention in pregnancy: 
the comparison with screening men for prostate cancer. The worry raised by prostate 
cancer screening is the course of events that can be set off by a false positive result 
(in many cases, a false positive result in an individual who was not at high risk in the 
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first place, a possibility that should call to mind the concern about Down syndrome in 
the low-risk case considered earlier). Barry writes that, 
Serial PSA screening has at best a modest effect
 
on prostate-cancer mortality during 
the first decade of follow-up.
 
This benefit comes at the cost of substantial 
overdiagnosis
 
and overtreatment. It is important to remember that the key
 
question is 
not whether PSA screening is effective but whether
 
it does more good than harm. For 
this reason, comparisons of
 
the ERSPC (European Randomized Study of Screening 
for Prostate Cancer) estimates of the effectiveness of PSA screening with,
 
for 
example, the similarly modest effectiveness of breast-cancer
 
screening cannot be 
made without simultaneously appreciating
 
the much higher risks of overdiagnosis 
and overtreatment associated
 
with PSA screening. (1351) 
 
The trouble with prostate cancer screening is that, when required of men 
regardless of their susceptibility or risk level for the disease, it will result in 
overdiagnosis and over treatment. These treatments are wide ranging in terms of their 
invasiveness and severity. Once something is diagnosed, however, whether accurately 
or inaccurately, there is a call for action on the part of the physician, and the course of 
action resulting from diagnosis is rarely questioned by the patient. Similarly for 
medical intervention in pregnancy. The use of indiscriminate investigative 
procedures, such as twenty-week ultrasounds, can result in the overdiagnosis of 
problems with the fetus. This, of course, is particularly worrisome in the case of 
patients who are not at risk. Once the alarm has been sounded, mothers and doctors 
alike are compelled to continue down the path of diagnostic screening and 
intervention. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to turn away from the risk of 
Down syndrome, or, even perhaps more so, a risk of the baby not thriving due to a 
prematurely ageing placenta. Once the problem has been identified, whether correctly 
or incorrectly, a path for action has been laid down for mother and physician alike.  
Here is where the analogy between intervention in pregnancy and PSA 
screening may begin to break down. If we were able to come up with a diagnostic 
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procedure that were 100% accurate in detecting prostate cancer, would the worry 
about PSA screening resolve itself? The answer to this question might seem to be an 
obvious ‗yes.‘ The primary concern in the case of PSA screening is that, in the event 
of a false positive, a chain of events is kicked off leading to unnecessary medical 
procedures including, in severe instances, the complete removal of the prostate in 
unaffected men. There seems to be nothing wrong with wanting to know if a man has 
prostate cancer; in fact, it seems an undeniably good thing to be able to answer that 
question. A more nuanced answer to this question, however, would acknowledge that 
a man can live with the diagnosis of prostate cancer for, in many cases, several 
decades before suffering any adverse symptoms from the disease. Indiscriminate PSA 
screening as it currently stands, then, leads to a significant number of false positives 
and the identification of cases in which the man will experience no effect from his 
condition, yet indeed has it. Even if we control for error, we may still be subjecting 
otherwise healthy men, men who are ultimately more at risk of death from something 
other than low-grade prostate cancer to unnecessary, invasive tests and treatments. 
And yet there is an overwhelming desire to know in these cases, regardless. 
 In the cases of patients like these, the answer is more likely to mimic the 
answer we get when we ask the question of diagnostic testing in pregnancy. Indeed, 
the question remains in the case of intervention and diagnostics in pregnancy. If we 
could develop a diagnostic technique that were 100% accurate in detecting things like 
Down syndrome, or an ageing placenta, would the worry dissolve? The answer, I 
think, is clearly ‗no.‘ There is, in the case of pregnancy, something troubling in the 
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very asking of these questions.  A certain kind of information or knowledge about the 
fetus has come to be valued over another.  
How is it that we have come to be asking the questions that we are about 
pregnancy? Why do we need to know if the baby is a boy or a girl, healthy or 
unhealthy, upside-down or right-side-up? In the case of some of these questions, the 
answer is obvious: because we can do something about it. For others, the answer is 
not so obvious. For others, the answer might be something more like, because we can 
know. To me, it is not at all clear why knowing, in the case of genetic testing, is any 
better than not knowing, and, moreover, why knowing in this privileged, empirical 
and scientific way is better. There is a certain kind of epistemic imperialism at play 
here. This epistemic imperialism sets out what the important questions are to be and 
sets out the ways in which we are to go about answering those questions. The kinds of 
questions we are asking and the kinds of answers we are getting are driven by, created 
by, the kinds of technology we have and not, instead, by a need we have for any 
particular kind of information. This undeniably sets up a hierarchy of knowledge, 
privileging the information that is technologically available, making it seem more 
important when, really, it is only more available. 
Another way of thinking about the way knowledge operates in pregnancy and 
childbirth is the trendiness of labor and delivery. With each of my three children, 
recommendations, practices and procedures, and testing and information gathering 
have gone through significant changes. For example, with my third child (a scheduled 
C-section) I was required to wear a fetal monitor for 2 hours before delivery. It is not 
clear what two hours of fetal heart rates tell you when you are having a delivery all 
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along, yet the technology is there and the information, wherever it goes or however it 
is used, is still collected. Everything from pacifier use to swaddling techniques have 
changed and each time this information is presented to me as the objective knowledge 
of how to care for my newborn. This is not to say that there is not important 
information, some of which is the product of scientific inquiry, that needs to be 
shared with new parents (e.g. the impact of shaken baby syndrome), but at some point 
intuition and individualized insight need to be acknowledged by doctors as additional 
epistemic goods.  
I hope that the investigation into comparisons among childbirth, PSA 
screening, and pregnancy have left little question as to the appropriateness of the 
concept of escalation of intervention as it applies to pregnancy. Each of our 
approaches to making the case for the applicability of the concept has unearthed some 
serious worries about the harmfulness of such an escalation of intervention. Briefly, 
then, I would like to reiterate some of the potential harms caused by such escalation 
on the whole (as opposed to the harm caused by intervention procedures themselves) 
before turning to a recommendation for how to better manage the issue. The damage 
caused by the escalation of intervention begins with how it changes the experience of 
pregnancy for the mother.  
Pregnancy can be and should be an exciting and positive experience for the 
mother. Pregnancy should be about developing a relationship with the fetus, about 
experiencing certain changes in your body and your life that are characteristically 
feminine (Hilden 100). Pregnancy should be about a growing sense of confidence in 
yourself as a mother. When medical intervention procedures are allowed to escalate 
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out of control, it changes the whole tone of pregnancy. It turns pregnancy into a 
medical crisis. It punctuates the felt flips and kicks of the fetus with fear instead of 
joy and anticipation. The escalation of intervention in pregnancy undermines the 
epistemic authority and control that the woman has over her pregnancy. When an 
individual‘s attempt to make meaning for herself is thwarted by a society‘s or an 
institution‘s incompatible understanding of an issue, Fricker deems it a case of 
hermeneutical injustice (155). She writes: 
When you find yourself in a situation in which you seem to be the only one to feel 
the dissonance between received understanding and your own intimidated sense of a 
give experience, it tends to knock your faith in your own ability to make sense of the 
world…[it] stem[s] most basically from the subject‘s loss of epistemic confidence. 
The various ways in which loss of epistemic confidence might hinder one‘s 
epistemic career are …that it can cause literal loss of knowledge, that it may prevent 
from one gaining new knowledge, and more generally, that it is likely to stop one 
gaining certain important epistemic virtues, such as intellectual courage. (163) 
 
 Two different, yet intertwined, claims that women have to knowledge about 
pregnancy, I believe, need to be disentangled here.  On the one hand, the historical 
practice of midwifery and the techniques, approaches, and insights that have been 
passed down by women to women throughout human history which has been replaced 
by the modern, medicalized approach to pregnancy we are more familiar with today 
does indeed suggest that there is some kind of special access, some practical insight 
women have to matters of managing pregnancy (Rich 149). Even if we bracket this 
possibility, there is yet another kind of knowledge that women have access to that is 
or can be challenged by technologically driven ways of knowing about pregnancy; 
women who are pregnant, or who have been pregnant, have what is called 
experiential knowledge of their pregnancy and of pregnancy in general. This kind of 
knowledge has historically been disregarded yet it is unquestionably valuable, and has 
the potential impact of altogether shifting the way an individual sees the world, and 
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sees herself in the world (Shapiro 59). This kind of knowledge, however, is not meant 
to compete with or mimic the kind of knowledge available through information-
seeking technologies used in pregnancy. At the same time, this kind of knowledge is 
indeed threatened by these technologies.  In fact, this kind of knowledge takes a back 
seat to the kind available to the physician by looking through the mother, whether by 
needle or sound wave.  
With these two distinct types of potential knowledge only women have about 
their pregnancies in mind, it is not the case that I am arguing that I—or any other 
woman—is in a position to know better than my doctors about the health and viability 
(or lack thereof) of my child in utero. What is being argued is that the preference for 
having the kind of knowledge available through medical diagnostics may be 
unfounded and the quest for this kind of information disrupts the course and 
experience of pregnancy. The privilege of and search for this kind of information 
about the pregnancy, however accurate or inaccurate the results, pushes aside the 
importance of the kind of insight a woman can have into her pregnancy, dramatically 
alters the way she experiences it, and depletes the sense of (and actual) control she 
has over how it unfolds.  
In conclusion, I hope that through an examination of the narrative case and 
comparisons with PSA screening and labor intervention, the claim that the same 
concept of escalation of intervention in labor maps onto medical intervention in 
pregnancy has been grounded in adequate justification. Similarly, the attention to the 
narrative and to the escalation of intervention in pregnancy in general, has underlined 
several epistemological concerns: the value of relevant kinds of knowledge (e.g., 
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technologically driven knowledge over intuition or experiential knowledge), whether 
knowledge is always better than ignorance and what circumstances would mitigate 
choices between the two, and how epistemic authority is distributed among pregnant 
women and their healthcare providers. With these epistemic concerns in mind in 
closing we ought to ask what might have been done otherwise, or whether we see any 
recommendations for the avoidance of raising issues like these in pregnancy.  
In answering, a frequently quoted line from remark 308 in Wittgenstein‘s 
Philosophical Investigations comes to mind: ―The decisive movement in the 
conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite 
innocent‖ (103). While removed from its original context we can interpret this to 
mean that we should start asking questions sooner. It was at the twenty-week 
ultrasound, a procedure I excitedly anticipated and in no way scrutinized, that the ball 
began rolling in this instance of escalation of intervention. The very asking of the 
kinds of questions answerable by medical technology in pregnancy (the decisive 
move in the conjuring trick) can have, and has had, the impact of setting off a 
destructive chain of events—a sequence of questions, answers, and approaches, that 
have the effect of causing the kind of epistemic harm to mothers and to families 
explored in these pages.   
Another way of approaching a solution is to avoid looking at knowledge as 
something abstract or abstractable from knowing agents, especially in the case of 
pregnancy. Here we are talking about two bodies; two bodies more interconnected 
than in any other relationship found in nature, yet trying to discern information about 
just one of them. It is important that we keep both features of the subject and the 
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object of knowledge in mind when we begin to analyze information seeking behavior. 
What features, then, do we need to include about knowers to make our theorizing 
about them productive and applicable?  
Approaches to epistemology that suggest some possible features of knowers 
and knowledge relevant here include insights from the disciplines of feminist and 
virtue epistemology, especially the argument in feminist epistemology that features of 
the knower (in particular, the gender of the knower) are relevant in circumscribing 
cases of knowledge. In her essay, ―Taking Subjectivity into Account,‖ Lorraine Code 
argues that relevant factors concerning a subject‘s situatedness, such as race, class, or 
gender, ought to be considered in any investigation of what the subject can or cannot 
rightly be said to know. She writes, ―…conditions that hold for any knower, 
regardless of her or his identity, interests, and circumstances, in other words of her or 
his subjectivity—could conceivably be discovered only for a narrow range of 
artificially isolated and purified empirical knowledge claims, which might be 
paradigmatic by fiat, but are unlikely so ‗in fact‘‖ (Code 191). She argues for what 
she calls an ―epistemology of everyday lives‖ and urges that we turn away from 
artificially sterilized models of knowledge that steer clear of what she takes to be the 
highly relevant circumstances of located knowers (Code 192).  
Code begins her argument with an assault on traditional ―s knows that p‖ 
epistemologies for their (often implicit) assumption that ‗s‘ and ‗p‘ are merely place 
holders which can be replaced by any s or any p, and maintain efficacy. When you 
begin to scrutinize the kinds of things you substitute for s and p, however, such a 
schema loses its capacity to represent many natural knowledge claims. According to 
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her interpretation of such approaches to representing knowledge claims, it follows 
that: ―If one cannot transcend subjectivity and particularities of its ‗locations,‘ then 
there is no knowledge worth analyzing‖ (192). Only a narrow subset of human 
knowledge claims, according to Code, can be isolated and analyzed by an 
epistemology which does not attend to the subjectivity of the knower.  
For Code, and for us, the location of the knower—his or her social identity, 
interests or desires, and circumstances of her situation—make it the case (or not) that 
some knowledge is desirable, undesirable, or even possible. As knowers we are not 
different from ourselves as patients or poets. What we can be said to know, what we 
set out to know, is limited, shaped, and driven by our location. Knowing is not 
something that we do apart from all of the other things that we do. Knowing is 
embedded in, constitutive of and constituted by our locations.  
The implication of this wider view of ourselves as knowers for the resolution 
of the tension arising from supposing that knowledge can be harmful to us as knowers 
means that harm caused to us by the pursuit or acquisition of knowledge that 
influences our location also influences us as knowers. Knowledge or knowledge 
seeking that changes our relationship with our spouse, for example, changes us as 
knowers. It circumscribes what we can know, how we can know, if we should know, 
whether we want to know, and so on. It could be pointed out here that a consequence 
of this claim is that any harm could somehow be construed as an epistemic harm.  
However, I want to limit our discussion to epistemic behaviors that have this potential 
impact, not just any behavior whatsoever.  
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To sum up, then, the implication of the wider view of ourselves as knowers 
means that harm caused to us by the pursuit or acquisition of knowledge that 
influences our location also influences us as knowers. We have further limited cases 
of interest to those of harm caused by epistemic activity, but not necessarily epistemic 
activity of a malicious type. Having a narrow epistemic focus on collecting facts can 
cut us off from having a wider epistemic relationship with the world. 
We are still left with the possibility of broadening what we mean by 
‗knowledge,‘ or increasing the kinds of things we consider to be epistemically 
valuable ends. Again, what we want to avoid is a depiction of knowledge that is 
somehow separate or separable from all of the other things that we do. Similarly, we 
want to avoid a narrowing of the epistemic, or the conflation of knowledge with 
epistemic good. In this chapter alone we have encountered many other ends that we 
might include in the realm of what constitutes an epistemic good: for example, 
intuition, meaning-making, experiential ―knowledge,‖ self-awareness (that is, 
discerning in advance what we might do with certain information and an ability to 
judge if we want that information to begin with), and a healthy skepticism of 
technologically driven knowledge. 
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Chapter Three: Nurses Know: How power and privilege influence nursing  
 
knowledge, work, and testimony. 
 
 
This chapter investigates the role of epistemic imperialism (unduly privileging 
knowledge of a certain sort, and methods of achieving knowledge of a certain sort, 
over other available knowledge/methods) and power imbalances between physicians, 
patients, and nurses in how nursing knowledge is received, represented, and 
understood not simply the players immediately involved (e.g. the physician, patient, 
and nurses) but also by the general public. I argue that what nurses know, and the 
work that they perform is often rendered invisible to patients, physicians, nurses, and 
the general public by the function of these power structures and epistemic 
imperialism. 
  Nurses operate with three types of special knowledge: case 
(biomedical/scientific), patient (applied case knowledge), and person (biographical 
knowledge of the patient) and because they operate with patient and person 
knowledge rather than just case knowledge (biomedical/scientific knowledge), they 
are better able to care for patients in the face of ignorance about the 
biomedical/scientific knowledge than physicians are. Because nursing is a boundary 
discipline, in that it operates both in and between two very different realms of 
knowledge (the scientific/biomedical realm and the subjective/personal realm), much 
of what nurses are up to in their day-to-day tasks is unseen or unacknowledged by 
patient, physician, and public and is not even recognized by nurses themselves as 
constituting work (Stein-Parbury and Laischenko, 2007).  
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As an example of how this invisibility plays out, I operate with a very 
personal narrative (that of my pregnancy with my third child) as representative of the 
critical role nurses played in coordinating my care, navigating me through the 
healthcare system, and seeing me through multiple complications. These three 
tasks—the coordination of care, navigating the patient through the healthcare system 
(referring patients and guiding them through and often outside of the labyrinthian 
institutions in which they are engaged), and providing personal attention and care to 
the patient—constitute the bulk of the work nurses are doing on a day-to-day basis. 
These three types of work partake in multiple realms of knowledge 
(biomedical/scientific and subjective/personal knowledge) at issue here. And yet, it is 
only the last of the three (paying personal attention to and caring for the patient) 
which is generally seen as what nurses do.
1
  
I argue that attention to epistemic imperialism and power imbalances in the 
healthcare system sheds light on the first two tasks (coordination of care and the 
assistance nurses provide patients in navigating the healthcare system). Attention to 
epistemic imperialism and power imbalances properly situates these tasks as 
recognizable work and highlights the relevant knowledge nurses operate with thus 
rendering it at least on par with the scientific/biomedical knowledge we have come to 
prefer as patients, healthcare providers, and members of the general public 
(Laischenko, 1997). Even with their work recognized as work and their knowledge 
recognized as knowledge, we need to push further and argue that:  nurses are subjects 
of testimonial injustice: an instance where we do not count information gleaned from 
someone‘s testimony as knowledge without corroboration—corroboration achieved 
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by bending over backward to verify (or even undermine) that person‘s claims 
(Fricker, 2007). 
Finally, it is only through examination of epistemic imperialism and power 
imbalances that we can begin to rectify these injustices suffered by nurses and, in so 
doing, improve our own understanding as patients and members of the general public 
of the importance of the work that nurses do and the knowledge that they, indeed, 
have. If nurses themselves cannot articulate their work as such, how will the 
knowledge of nursing work ever be disseminated? Therefore, attention to these 
epistemic issues is also central to nursing education.  
 
In this chapter I will first explore the role of epistemic imperialism in the 
hierarchal structure of healthcare. I will demonstrate that because a certain type of 
knowledge is privileged over others, the knowledge nurses have and, therefore, the 
work that they do are rendered invisible. I will explore this invisibility and how it 
relates to the historical invisibility of women‘s work. I will use a personal example to 
demonstrate the invisibility of nursing work and knowledge. I will then demonstrate 
that the framework used for nursing knowledge has a general applicability the broader 
work of this dissertation. I will discuss the fact that, since nurses operate with these 
other sorts of knowledge, they are better able to care for patients than physicians in 
the absence of biomedical/scientific knowledge which has become so overvalued. I 
will also show that nurses‘ knowledge, because of the privilege for biomedical 
scientific knowledge, subjects them to testimonial injustice. I will then explore 
avenues for rectifying this injustice by putting nursing knowledge on par with 
biomedical/scientific knowledge. I will argue further that epistemology must inform 
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nursing education in order for nurses to adequately give voice to the importance of 
the knowledge they have and the work that they do, moving it out of the shadows and 
placing it front and center.  
Epistemic Imperialism 
Power imbalances in the healthcare system favor the physician. Nurses work 
in a layered hierarchy with physicians at the top, PA‘s, RN‘s, nurses, nursing aids, 
and hospital staff (lab techs, janitorial staff) at the bottom. Nurses, although they do a 
great deal of work, are not at the top of the hierarchy. Why is this the case? I believe 
it is the case not just for historical reasons, but also because of the privilege of the 
kinds of knowledge that physicians are after (biomedical/scientific). When one type 
of knowledge is privileged over another, it pushes the other types of things we can 
come to know to the side. So, in this case, privilege for lab results, CT scans, MRI 
imaging, x-rays, etc., pushes aside the patient‘s own retelling of their story—of what 
happened to them, and of how the disease/injury is impacting his or her life. (You 
might point out here that, if we are relying on these sophisticated scanning 
techniques, then aren‘t, we in some way epistemically privileging, say, the CT 
technician? While most technicians can indeed read their own scans, they are required 
to pass them along to a physician in order to give their own validated read.) 
The function of the power imbalance influences the skewed preference for 
knowledge. This skewed preference puts much of the knowledge nurses have on a 
lower level than knowledge available through imaging/testing. This, in turn, puts 
nurses and their work on a lower level. It is both the power informing the 
epistemology and the epistemology informing the power. What I mean by this is that 
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the power structure keeps the epistemic imperialism in place and, at the same time, 
epistemic imperialism props up the power structure. Nurses are not in positions of 
power because the knowledge they have is not taken seriously, and because they are 
not in a position of power, what they say is not taken seriously.  
I argue that what nurses know, and the work that they perform is often 
rendered invisible to patients, physicians, nurses, and the general public by the 
function of these power structures and epistemic imperialism.  
Invisible Work 
Caring professions, such as nursing and early childhood education are 
traditionally undervalued as they are inherently linked with women‘s work: the work 
of running a household. Caring for and feeding your husband and children, keeping 
the house clean, etc. are what women were once understood as doing, and any type of 
work that links up with caring in this same way has the risk of being rendered 
invisible in the same way traditional women‘s work has been rendered invisible.  
The power imbalances in which women lived when housework was invisible 
mimic the power imbalances in the structure of the healthcare system. There was/is a 
hierarchy with men at the top, women and their work in the middle, and children at 
the bottom. This is similar to the hierarchy in healthcare with physicians at the top, 
nurses in the middle, and janitorial staff, etc. at the bottom. Because the power 
imbalances are informed by epistemic imperialism, epistemic imperialism influences 
these power imbalances. In the case of traditional women‘s work, surely women‘s 
knowledge of how to get household work done was undervalued as compared to a 
man‘s knowledge of how to get his own work done. 
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Because nursing is a boundary discipline in that it operates both in and 
between two very different realms of knowledge (the scientific/biomedical realm and 
the subjective/personal realm), much of what nurses are up to in their day-to-day 
tasks is unseen or unacknowledged by patient, physician, and public, alike, and is not 
even recognized by nurses themselves as constituting work (Stein-Parbury and 
Laischenko, 1997). Here we may start to see parallels between sexist, domestic life in 
which the women were both the visible care takers (preparing meals, tying ties) as 
well as the invisible care takers (keeping the home clean and spotless while the family 
is away during the day). Nurses and others may see their direct role of caring 
(administering medication, taking blood pressure, reporting to the physician) while 
missing the invisible work nurses are up to during their shifts such as keeping patient 
notes, talking with the patients under their care, talking with family, communicating 
problems to the physician, etc.  
Narrative 
My pregnancy started in mid-2013 with complication: After an IUD became 
imbedded in my uterine wall and needed to be surgically removed, I was prescribed 
progesterone only pills (or mini-pills) because I suffer from migraines and other 
forms of birth control pills which contain estrogen can actually exacerbate migraines. 
Progesterone only pills need to be taken at precise times: being off schedule for more 
than a few hours can result in pregnancy, and that is what happened in my case. 
Before learning I was pregnant I had engaged in behavior that was risky—in 
particular, I took taken prescription medication for migraine treatment that is 
relatively high risk to the unborn fetus. Although I learned of the pregnancy early 
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(because I noticed my headaches were not being relieved by ordinary measures, and 
unrelenting headaches had been characteristic of my previous two pregnancies), and 
none of these behaviors actually impacted the developing embryo, it was still deemed 
high-risk. It should be noted I received a category D medication prior to implantation 
(Depakote), for migraine treatment I was also still taking category C medications.  
Category C medications are of several types. Some medications are classed 
category C because there is evidence in animals that at extremely high doses 
(thousands of times the therapeutic dose) can cause birth defects, low birth weight or 
other problems with the neonate animals. Others are category C because they have 
been shown to be unlikely to cause much harm to the fetus in humans. Even others 
are category C because they have no evidence for or against harm to the fetus. 
Category D medications have been shown to increase the likelihood of harm 
to the fetus in humans. Category X medications produce harm in most cases. 
Category D and X medications are not recommended in pregnancy. Category C 
medications are often prescribed by OB/GYNs and other providers during pregnancy. 
Category D drugs are rarely used in pregnancy, but if the mother has a condition like 
epilepsy that, if she were to have a seizure, could cause harm to both herself and her 
fetus, then they may be prescribed. Category X drugs are not prescribed during 
pregnancy. 
So the pregnancy was from the outset complicated with respect to the fact that 
I was on multiple medications which required monitoring and the coordination of 
care. The pregnancy shortly became yet more complicated: after missing a step, I 
twisted in an unusual way and tore multiple ligaments holding my pubic symphysis 
66 
 
together. I was not able to walk well, take stairs, etc. To address the injury, I was 
prescribed medication, went to see multiple other providers (orthopedics and PT) and 
told to ―rest.‖ A nurse at my OB clinic helped me find the appropriate kind of 
physical therapist and orthopedist for someone who is pregnant.  
Yet, rest was difficult to come by while teaching and caring for two young 
kids. This injury occurred in April, and with a C-section scheduled for July 11
th
, I 
started counting down the days. As the baby grew, the pain became more severe. 
When the baby‘s head dropped into my pelvis, I could barely walk. As a result, they 
rescheduled the C-section for July 1
st
 and our son, Abbey, was born that day. He was 
watched in the hospital by the nurses and physicians with great scrutiny to determine 
if he was experiencing withdrawal from any of the medications I was using during my 
pregnancy. He showed no signs of withdrawal in the hospital, and shows no ill effects 
to this day. 
After Abbey was born I was alone with three children while my partner was 
away on a research trip. Despite help from family and friends, I was unable to take 
good enough care of myself to heal from the surgery and injury. I had severe pain and 
lost 30 pounds in 30 days.  
When my partner returned in august I was finally able to get back to the 
doctor. After multiple visits, a CT scan, and an ultrasound, they finally found 
something that ―backed up‖ my story of pelvic pain. They found a sack of fluid in my 
uterus. After being sent to the ER for pain, I came into the clinic for them to attempt 
to biopsy the fluid. Because of the pain, they were unable to do a manual exam, and 
the scheduled me for a dilation and curettage.  
67 
 
When I arrived at the day surgery center a week later, I was told I was not on 
the surgery schedule. I was adamant that they were mistaken. I asked to speak to the 
doctor who was (not) scheduled to do my surgery. She was unable to talk to me. I 
walked to my clinic and demanded an explanation. I was given the option of going 
home and coming back next week (not a viable option for me, given my level of pain 
and the fact that I had been fasting for 13 hours and weighed only 104 lbs) or waiting 
to see if they could squeeze me in to the schedule that afternoon. I opted to wait. 
 When they finally took me in for surgery, the anesthesiologist and her nurse 
told me that if at any time during the procedure I was uncomfortable, all I had to do 
was ask for full anesthesia and they would put me under. During the operation, I was 
in a great deal of pain. I cried out for help but was ignored by the anesthesiologist and 
her staff. I heard them order an anti-biotic and asked what those were for. No one 
answered me.  
It was not until I was in recovery that someone explained to me what had 
happened: they had perforated my uterus during the operation with the curettage. This 
put me at risk of bleeding, infection, and increased the risk to my uterus for any future 
pregnancies, I was told. 
Eventually, I filed a patient complaint for all that had happened to me. I still have not 
heard back from Fairview patient relations. I am on high doses of pain medication 
which impair my ability to focus, work, write, think, take care of my children, and 
drive.  
So what was the role of the nurses in this narrative? First, any coordination of 
care between my neurologist, psychiatrist, and OB/GYN for managing my medication 
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was done by nurses. This meant that nurses from my OB/GYN had to call nurses 
from my neurologist and psychiatrist‘s office to get information about what 
medication I was on, okay medication changes made by doctors, etc. Second, nurses 
helped me navigate through the healthcare system when I became injured: helping me 
acquire referrals, finding the right providers, etc. Third, nurses helped me coordinate 
with my doctor when the C-section had to be rescheduled. Fourth, nurses were 
involved in the C-section, and were the primary people involved with my aftercare. 
Fifth, nurses watched the baby for signs of withdrawal and communicated their 
findings at shift change. Sixth, nurses helped me schedule an appointment when my 
partner came back to be seen for my pubic pain and bleeding. They also helped me 
coordinate the proper imaging that the doctors wanted. Seventh, they helped me make 
decisions about what to do when the pain became so severe (such as go into the ER) 
and ultimately schedule for surgery. Eighth, when the surgery was mis-scheduled, it 
was a nurse who coordinated my options and ultimately got me back on the surgery 
schedule. Finally, they helped me coordinate referrals to a pain clinic, endocrinology, 
neurology, and PT, as well as continue to help me with my patient relations 
complaint. 
While it might seem like it is the doctors who work their magic and, say, order 
the proper pain medication for me or squeeze me into their schedule, it is actually a 
nurse laboring behind the scenes trying to get a physician to sign off on a pain-
medication change. It was nurses who helped me in my hospital stay: monitoring 
Abbey closely, although he was fine, managing my pain post-operatively and post-
Bolivia. It was nurses who held my hand through the D & C and ultimately explained 
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to me what happened with the procedure and how it had gone wrong. It was a nurse 
who managed my pain post-op. It was the coordination of nurses who got me on the 
proper pain medication regimen to keep my pain (somewhat) under control. And it is 
nurses who are guiding me through the system: to neurology, endocrinology, physical 
therapy, psychiatry, and a pain clinic. 
These tasks dip in to both biomedical/scientific and personal/subjective knowledge. 
And yet, it is only one of the three: paying personal attention to and caring for the 
patient, which is generally seen as what nurses do (Laischenko, 1998).   
I argue that attention to epistemic imperialism and power imbalances in the 
healthcare system shed light on the two tasks that went ―unseen‖: coordination of my 
care and the assistance nurses provided me in navigating the healthcare system. 
Attention to these two tasks demonstrates that nurses have knowledge—albeit 
testimonial knowledge, from the patients, that is important to the coordination of care, 
the expectation for outcomes, etc. If we don‘t know what someone does for a living 
or how much help they have at home or can reasonably be expected to get, then we 
don‘t know anything about their health outcomes. What I mean by this is that I can 
make prescriptions, for example, for someone to ―rest.‖ But if I don‘t know what they 
do for a living or what their home situation is like, how can I know they will actually 
be able to rest? I need to know certain facts about a person‘s life before I can begin to 
tell them what they need to do for their health. I need to know what they are capable 
of doing.  
I argue that attention to epistemic imperialism and power imbalances properly 
situates the tasks nurses do that we don‘t acknowledge as recognizable work and 
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highlights the relevant knowledge nurses operate with thus rendering it at least on par 
with the scientific/biomedical knowledge we have come to prefer as patients, 
healthcare providers, and members of the general public (I will demonstrate why I 
believe this is the case shortly) (Laischenko, 1997). 
Framework of Nursing Knowledge 
Liaschenko and Fisher develop an interesting framework in nursing 
epistemology for the types of knowledge used by nurses on the job. It includes three 
primary types of knowledge: biomedical/scientific; patient knowledge; and person 
knowledge. These types of knowledge are connected by social knowledge. 
Biomedical/scientific knowledge is the type of knowledge that nurses gain 
both on the job and in their schooling. It has to do with anatomy and physiology, 
different technologies used in patient care such as EKG‘s and ultrasound, and 
knowledge of pharmaceuticals.  
Patient knowledge is understood by Liaschenko and Fisher as 
biomedical/scientific knowledge now applied to the case at hand. So patient 
knowledge has to do with monitoring how the patient is responding to therapeutic 
practices employed in their case.  
Person knowledge, on the other hand, has to do with the patient in the context 
of their everyday life. It requires testimony from the patient regarding what kind of 
work they do, what their home life is like, what relationships and help they have, etc. 
Liaschenko and Fisher have reservations about the amount of person knowledge it is 
appropriate for nurses to have in a given context. It is my contention that person 
knowledge is undervalued. 
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Liaschenko and Fisher argue that social knowledge connects these three types 
of knowledge. For example, social knowledge connecting biomedical/scientific 
knowledge to patient knowledge might be the knowledge a nurse has of a particular 
surgeon. They may know things about the surgeon such as what types of pain 
medication they tend to order for their patients, how practiced they are and what 
techniques they use for a given surgical procedure, etc. 
The social knowledge connecting patient knowledge to person knowledge 
would include things like what the family members say or know about the patient‘s 
wishes, information gleaned from other nurses about the patient at shift change, etc. 
Here is a depiction of her framework of nursing knowledge as she sees it: 
Figure 3.2 Nursing Knowledge, Laischenko and Fisher 
 
  
I want to argue two things about this framework: First, I believe that it has wider 
applicability than to just nursing knowledge. I believe that it can help us understand 
Biomedical/Scientific 
Knowledge 
(Case Knowledge) 
Patient Knowledge Person Knowledge 
Social Knowledge Social Knowledge 
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much more than the types of knowledge nurses have. I believe that it applies to 
physicians, patients, and the general public. 
Second, I believe that something goes wrong when one of these types of 
knowledge is privileged over others. That is, when we have a preference for (as a 
society, as healthcare consumers and workers) biomedical knowledge, the other two 
types of knowledge, most importantly, person knowledge, gets pushed aside. 
It is my contention that this is what is currently occurring in medicine. There is a 
heavy reference for the biomedical/scientific knowledge and, when a patient presents 
with a problem, it is almost automatically that kind of information that members of 
the healthcare system are after. This kind of knowledge is expensive, and often quite 
unnecessary. Yet it is what physicians call for before they are willing to make their 
diagnosis. And it is the nurse‘s job to prep the patient for whatever procedure they 
have deemed necessary. Work that goes unnoticed, and knowledge that goes unsaid. 
Caring in the Face of Ignorance 
Because nurses operate with more than just case knowledge, they are better 
able to care for patients than physicians in the absence of biomedical/scientific 
knowledge about the patient than are physicians, who overvalue biomedical/scientific 
knowledge. Knowledge of the patient and knowledge of the person allow nurses to 
care for patients when, for example, imaging is not available. Because they take the 
patient‘s testimony (with some reasonable reservations) seriously, they are able to 
care for, say, a broken wrist without an x-ray. They could, for example, treat as if the 
patient has a broken wrist by advocating for pain medication, splinting the wrist, and 
giving the patient directions about how to go about getting an x-ray to confirm the 
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nurse‘s suspicions that the wrist may be broken. They are able to evaluate the patient 
with a combination of listening to the patient‘s story, and asking the patient to 
perform certain tasks, such as moving their fingers. If a patient‘s story and their 
symptomology line up, the nurse can treat without an x-ray. 
 You would be hard-pressed to find a doctor who was willing to treat a broken 
wrist as a broken wrist without the diagnostic confirmation via x-ray, or even a CT 
scan or MRI to look at damage to soft tissue. While doctors may do this when they 
have no other choice (if the patient does not have insurance to cover the imaging or 
they are working in another country where imaging technology is few and far 
between) a physician who has access to these devices is more than likely to use them. 
Is this in the interest of the patient or in the interest of the physician? Because 
physicians are paid by the number of tests and procedures they perform, it is hard to 
imagine that some of the physician‘s interests don‘t come in to play. However, we 
can see, too, that an x-ray confirming a broken wrist could show them more 
accurately how to treat, say if the bone needed resetting. So it may as well, also, be in 
the patient‘s interest. What is paramount, however, is that the patient get prompt care 
for their condition. In the case at hand, this calls for pain medication and stabilization 
of the wounded area. These are all things that can be done without 
biomedical/scientific knowledge. Stabilizing a wrist and ordering pain medication can 
be done in the face of ignorance of biomedical/scientific knowledge. This is the case 
because other types of knowledge can be relied on. The patient‘s ability to wiggle his 
or her fingers (patient knowledge) and the story they tell about the injury (person 
knowledge) allow a nurse to care for the patient without imaging. This is critical to 
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care that needs a prompt response. This is something nurses can do, and some nurses 
do very well. This is something that physicians, on the other hand, are not so 
practiced at. 
 While in our imaginary case of the broken wrist, we are imagining someone 
with adequate healthcare access, if we change the scenario a bit and allow that they 
do not have adequate access to health care, the situation, and the need for care in the 
face of ignorance increases dramatically. Take, for example, my father. He works as a 
contractor and has had various illnesses and injuries simply as a result of his work. He 
has no health insurance coverage and, because his care is fragmented, he has little to 
no health history. When he receives care for something like a broken wrist, he does so 
at different locations, and pays out of pocket. If my father broke his wrist, it would be 
very cost-effective for him to work with someone who was able to treat in the face of 
ignorance. He has had to turn down lab work, x-rays, CT scans, and MRI‘s all in 
order to be able to afford his medical treatment.  
 So who would be an optimal care-giver for him? A nurse or a physician? I 
argue that a nurse would be better suited to care for someone like my father. They pay 
attention to his story, assess his symptomology, and can treat him without a lot of 
imaging or a health record. This is because they listen to him, and listen well. They 
also pay attention to the way his injury will be impacted by and impact the type of 
work he does. Even with a severely broken ankle, one of the nurses he saw did not 
tell him to rest, or even give him crutches. They knew, by listening to him, that this 
kind of advice and intervention would be ignored, and therefore ineffective. My 
father does not take time off work for injury or illness. He is up on a ladder with a 
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broken ankle. This is something only someone who listens will know. They treat him 
with respect to the reality of who he is, of what his life is like as a person. And this is 
more effective than having him ―follow‖ orders that are inconsistent with the way he 
lives his life. Instead, they give him advice on how to continue working with an 
injury. They treat as if he has a broken bone without an x-ray to confirm. They 
prescribe pain medication that is effective, but does not impair his ability to work. 
And above all, they give him comfort and alternative options for follow up care, such 
as a phone call versus a visit. 
 Being able to care in the absence of biomedical/scientific knowledge is a skill 
nurses have developed because they have developed other forms of knowledge that 
allow for treatment without test results. This is especially important for individuals 
with limited access to healthcare, such as my father.  
Testimonial Injustice 
Fricker‘s testimonial injustice, one of the multiple types of epistemic 
injustices that she gives voice to in here text, is characterized by when the listener 
does not grant full authority to the information that they are being given. That is, the 
information transmitted through testimony actually has a lower level of credibility 
than information learned another way.  
I argue, further, that nurses are subjects of testimonial injustice: where we do 
not count information gleaned from someone‘s testimony as knowledge without 
corroboration—corroboration achieved by bending over backward to verify (or even 
undermine) that person‘s claims (Fricker, 2007). 
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 Patient knowledge is knowledge gleaned through the testimony of the patient. 
Moreover, the nurses then have to testify to the other healthcare workers on behalf of 
the patient about their pain level, the amount of help they have at home, etc. So 
nurses get information testimonially and transmit it testimonially. But we have come 
to undervalue testimony as a proper source of knowledge particularly in a health care 
setting. We prefer medical charts and lab tests to patient reports of an accident or an 
illness manifesting in their lives. Physicians also prefer test results to nursing 
testimony. Why do we suppose this is the case? It is a part of a doctor‘s job to 
diagnose and treat, so this handles some of it, but it is also part of their job to care, 
and without nurse and patient testimony, it is hard to see them playing this role very 
well.  
 Collaboration between doctors and nurses is critical to successful patient 
outcomes. Yet collaboration breaks down when doctors undervalue the testimony of 
nurses and prefer lab results, etc.. According to Liaschenko, collaboration breaks 
down when nurses and doctors rely on different knowledge bases. When they share a 
knowledge base (biomedical/scientific, i.e., case knowledge) collaboration is 
successful. When they operate with different knowledge bases, e.g. a nurse operating 
with patient or person knowledge and a doctor operating with simply case knowledge, 
collaboration breaks down. Physicians dismiss nurses‘ reports as ―vague and 
confused‖: when no biomedical cause is evident. They also viewed nurses‘ evaluation 
of a patient as ―imprecise, and wanted facts, not opinions‖ (Laischenko, 2007).  
 Nurses remarked that ―doctors have other priorities;‖ that there was difficulty 
in getting doctors to order adequate sedation in cases of confusion and agitation in the 
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ICU; ―I can‘t get through to them;‖ ―they don‘t understand;‖ ―they put you off;‖ ―they 
only stand at the bedside for fifteen minutes;‖ ―they focus on what they know: 
hypothetical scenarios‖ (Laischenko, 2007). 
 In both the doctors‘ and nurses‘ remarks we can see that when there is no 
shared knowledge base, collaboration breaks down. It is only if physicians value and 
understand patient and person knowledge that they will rectify their assessment of 
nurses claims. Similarly, if physicians operated with, or at least understood patient 
and person knowledge, they would not be so quick to dismiss nurse‘s reports as 
―vague and confused.‖ They need a shared knowledge base to keep collaboration 
front and center. This is good for patient outcomes, but it is also good for nurses. 
They will find their knowledge validated and collaboration can continue beyond the 
biomedical/scientific boundary of knowledge (Laischenko, 2007). So there are two 
distinct things happening here on the part of physicians. In the first place, they are 
getting at taking seriously nurses knowledge when it does not stem from the 
biomedical/scientific. Second, and equally as important, they are taking cues from 
nurse about how to go about achieving this person knowledge for themselves. That is, 
their bedside manner is starting to improve as it mimics that of a nurse.  
Solving the Problem 
 Beyond shared knowledge bases, it is also through examination of epistemic 
imperialism and power imbalances that we can begin to rectify these injustices 
suffered by nurses and, in so doing, improve our own understanding as patients and 
members of the general public of the importance of the work that nurses do and the 
knowledge that they, indeed, have.  
78 
 
Recognizing that nurses do more than what we think they do is essential. 
Understanding that nurses spend most of their time coordinating care, navigating 
patients through the healthcare system, passing along information to other healthcare 
workers, advocating for patients, listening to their stories, and treating in the face of 
ignorance will highlight this type of work as recognizable work.  
It will let nurses, other healthcare workers, patients, and the public see the 
work they actually do as integral, important, and not to be downplayed. It will help 
nurses advocate for themselves and advocate for patients and families.  
Attention to the epistemic problem of privileging biomedical/scientific 
knowledge over the other types of knowledge nurses have will function to highlight 
the work nurses do as work. It will help nurses themselves see what they are doing 
with most of their time is work. Once nurses see their work as work, they can 
disseminate that information to other healthcare workers, patients, and the general 
public. For, if nurses themselves cannot articulate their work as such, how will the 
knowledge of nursing work ever be disseminated? 
Because testimonial injustice is so deeply ingrained in the way we think 
about, not just nursing, but deeply infects how we attribute credibility to anyone in a 
position of creating testimony, eliminating some of the prejudices that have been in 
many ways absorbed by the practice will undoubtedly prove to be challenging. The 
answer is not simple naiveté. There are some reasons we don‘t trust the testimony of 
others that seem like altogether good reasons. A simple one would be: has this person 
been honest with you in the past? If the answer is no, it may well be appropriate to 
look for corroborating evidence to back up their story. Yet if the party in question has 
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never given you any reason to doubt them, or perhaps you find yourself considering 
character traits that are quite irrelevant to truth-telling such as class, race, gender, etc. 
Fricker, as well as myself, would urge that this person be given the benefit of the 
doubt. We can learn so much from one another if we are willing to take testimony as 
knowledge. And, as mentioned before, this will never be an absolute avenue to 
knowledge; there will always be people who use testimony for deception, we stand to 
lose much more guarding against that unlikely occurrence and by validating the 
testimony of so many others, we stand to do a lot of good, not just for ourselves, but 
by legitimizing them as epistemic agents.  
Epistemology and Nursing Education 
According to Liaschenko, some nurses who were interviewed did not even 
notice the type of work they were doing, such as helping a patient coordinate 
referrals, communicating information at shift change, etc. as work (Laischenko and 
Fischer, 1999) It is difficult to see how others will come to see nursing work as work 
if nurses themselves don‘t see it as such. This is why we need to make reforms to the 
way nursing education is done. All healthcare professionals need to be taught to value 
their ways of knowing and recognize the work nurses do as such. 
 I began my inquiry into the way nursing education was being done at a very 
superficial level—by looking more closely at the mission statements of two leading 
nursing schools in Minnesota and pulling them apart: the University of Minnesota‘s 
school of Nursing and St. Catherine‘s University.  
The University of Minnesota‘s School of Nursing mission statement is ―to 
generate knowledge and prepare nurse leaders who will create, lead, and participate in 
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holistic efforts to improve the health of all people within the context of their 
environments.‖2 I was curious about several things: (1) when they speak about 
generating knowledge, I wanted to know what kind of knowledge they were hoping to 
generate; (2) when they spoke about holistic efforts, I wanted to know if this meant 
they took a wider view of what counted as medical care; and (3) when they spoke of 
the patient within the context of their environments, I wanted to know whether they 
were referring to person knowledge. Their vision statement was: ―the School of 
Nursing envisions a workplace where nurses lead collaborative efforts to attain 
optimal health for all people.‖ I was curious about the role of leaders for nurses in 
collaboration. I sent an email to several people in the nursing department to inquire 
about their mission and vision statements and received a response. 
 The University of Minnesota responded to my queries: (1) The School of 
Nursing has many faculty engaged in research programs that lead to new evidence 
that informs improvements in practice and more effective health interventions.  All 
the knowledge generated here, through discoveries, is aimed at improving health 
outcomes.  (2) For nurses, holistic means a whole-person approach to care and 
treatment.  Nurses want to understand the person in the context of their 
environment.  If, for example, a patient presents a compound wrist fracture, a nurse's 
approach would be to investigate bone density, history of skeletal fractures, calcium 
intake, cause of the fracture, safety in his home, and watch and listen for other 
signs.  Yes, holistic can also mean integrating one type of care with another, such as 
non-western.  (3) I don't know what "person knowledge" is.  But nurses (and many of 
their research projects) focus on environmental factors affecting health.  The relevant 
                                                     
2
 http://www.nursing.umn.edu/about/index.htm accessed on: 11/30/2014 
81 
 
context could be something like air quality.  Or it could be characteristics of the 
person's home, such as living with a smoker, or being homeless or not having a fully 
functioning kitchen, or a patient who is responsible for caring for other family 
members.  All these contextual factors can affect a person's health. In most cases, it's 
helpful to know the context.  In some cases, the nurse may take it upon himself or 
herself to connect the patient with resources that can help make positive changes to 
the environment.
3
   
 At St. Catherine‘s University, I also found someone to respond to my inquiry. 
First, it should be noted that St. Kate‘s mission statement was not accessible to me 
from the department‘s webpage. It is an internal document that was sent to me by the 
director of nursing education.
4
 St. Kate‘s vision statement is: ―to be a leading 
Catholic university educating nurses to lead and influence,‖ while their mission 
statement is to ―educate nursing […] students to become leaders.‖ Moreover, ―our 
commitment to excellence and ethical leadership in nursing is based upon the 
principles of Catholic social teaching, contemporary nursing knowledge, and 
professional and academic standards.‖ Additionally, ―the department of nursing 
fosters learning through caring relationships and interdisciplinary collaboration, is 
committed to the centrality of the liberal arts, and celebrates and reflects diversity in 
our society.‖  
 Their internal document went into some greater detail: For example, they 
indicate the role of the liberal arts in nursing education stating that it ―provide[s] the 
foundation for and are integrated throughout the nursing curriculum. This liberal arts 
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 Correspondence between Barbara Shafler and myself on: 11/30/2014 and 12/31/2014 
4
 Email from Margaret Pharris, Director of Nursing Department.  11/30/2014. 
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foundation and integration enables students to become critical, creative, and reflective 
thinkers who embrace a holistic worldview and seek truth [emphasis added].‖ Ethics: 
―informs application of liberal arts, basic and human sciences, and nursing 
knowledge. The practice of ethics in nursing professes our respect for the inherent 
dignity, worth, and uniqueness of each person. Ethics inspires freedom and excellence 
and champions access.‖ Access: ―opens doors to new ways of personal and 
professional knowing, learning, and leading. Access anticipates the needs of 
individual students based on their unique goals and plans, resources and experiences, 
abilities and gifts. Access involves designing processes and systems that maximize 
each student‘s success as a learner and identity as a leader. Access promotes lifelong 
learning.‖ Diversity: ―Enhances, expands, and extends the scope and quality of our 
nursing program. Diversity is integral to and complimentary with our commitment to 
access. Diversity is a powerful educational resource that enriches the learning 
environment and inspires excellence.‖ Excellence: ―Challenges what is, inspires what 
could be, and strives to make a difference. Excellence is about cultivating virtue, 
developing moral character, and living with integrity. Excellence in nursing education 
demands excellent faculty, excellent curriculum, and excellent resources. Excellence 
in nursing demands theory-guided, evidence based, reflective practice. Excellence in 
nursing practice demands competence, collaboration, and caring. Leaders in nursing 
are exemplars of excellence who exercise leadership in relationships.‖ Relationships: 
―define who we are and how we act. Teaching and learning take place in 
relationships. Leadership and followership take place in relationships. Nursing and 
healing take place in relationships. Relationships need communication and nurtured 
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environments that invite connection and interaction, reflection and expression, self-
awareness and reciprocity. Relationships foster leaders; leaders foster relationships.‖  
These documents led to a number of questions for me, so I sent them back to the 
director of nursing education. She was unable to answer my questions and forwarded 
them to Kathleen Kalb.
5
 I asked her a number of questions including: 
1. What do you mean by 'contemporary nursing knowledge?' 
Response: This concept is intentionally broad and refers to the body of 
nursing knowledge specific to the discipline of nursing as well as the 
knowledge that is used by nurses to guide nursing practice. 
2. With respect to the Liberal Arts section, what truths do you seek? 
Response: The phrase ―seek truth‖ relates to cultivating a spirit of 
inquiry that seeks truth in both faith and reason.  This relates to the 
University‘s liberal arts goal, Critical and Creative Inquiry. 
3. With respect to the ethics section, Could you explain how you believe 
ethics informs nursing knowledge? 
Response: I think the intention of this statement is that ―Ethics informs 
the application of nursing knowledge‖; for example, how ―the practice 
of ethics in nursing‖ bears witness to our respect for human dignity in 
the profession and practice of nursing. 
4. What do you mean by personal and professional knowing? 
Response: Personal and professional knowing can be related to the 
four fundamental patterns of knowing described by Carper (1978) as 
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empirics, esthetics, ethics, and personal knowing, and more recently, 
as emancipatory knowing (Chinn & Kramer, 2008; 2011; 2015). 
So, what would I change about nursing education? All healthcare 
professionals need to be made aware of the hierarchy in which they work. They need 
to be made aware of epistemic imperialism and how it shapes and influences and is 
shaped and influenced by the hierarchy. They need to learn to work collaboratively 
and learn to break down the barriers set up by the hierarchy. They need to learn the 
importance of bedside manner and the importance of hearing a patient‘s story. They 
need to pay attention to the way their prescriptions impact that person‘s life. In order 
to do that, they need to listen to the patient. They need to take the patient‘s testimony 
as knowledge. 
Nurses are good at this. Nurses are good at listening to and advocating for 
patients. All healthcare workers need to learn from nurses who do their job well how 
they do it. How do they listen? How do they treat without the biomedical/scientific 
knowledge that doctors privilege? How do they treat in the face of ignorance? And 
how are they so good at it? How did they learn to be good listeners? What lessons can 
other healthcare workers learn from good nurses? 
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Chapter Four: Hermeneutical Injustice, “World”-Traveling, and the Disabled. 
 
In this section, I will offer a revision of Miranda Fricker‘s notion of 
hermeneutical injustice—one which has been deeply informed by José Medina‘s 
work. In this conception, I agree that there is indeed an epistemic injustice 
occurring—the inability of an individual or group to make sense of his, her, or their 
experience—but attend to the concern of to whom they are attempting to make sense 
of these experiences. In line with Medina, I argue that it is possible for an individual 
to make sense of an experience for him or herself in spite of whether or not these 
same meanings are acknowledged by others, and, further, that individuals within a 
marginalized group, too, are able to develop and share meaning amongst themselves 
without uptake from the dominant whole. Yet hermeneutical injustice occurs when 
there is no corresponding uptake by the dominant discourse. In this way we could 
have an alternative interpretation validated somehow, but if the dominant discourse 
does not acknowledge it, it becomes a minority viewpoint that, for various reasons, is 
not adopted in the wider discourse.  I argue that hermeneutically marginalized groups 
are indeed bestowed with hermeneutical resources and that, furthermore, in line with 
the contentions of Medina, they are even possibly better positioned to possess 
epistemic virtues less accessible to those who are not epistemically and generally 
oppressed.  
Finally, in fleshing out what these obligations look like, or what they amount 
to, I will turn to the work of María Lugones and argue that it is only through 
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sustained, often uncomfortable, interpersonal contact with the epistemic other that we 
can overcome hermeneutical injustice. Moreover, I will attempt to show that knowing 
what it is like is the distinct end product of this contact, which Lugones terms ―world 
traveling,‖ and that, in order to fully appreciate and know what it is like, one has to 
struggle with and possibly abandon some, perhaps many, of our self-perceived 
identity traits. Knowing what it is like via world traveling necessitates to at least some 
degree, altering our own self-conceptions.  
To this point, the large majority of the work that I have encountered thus far 
on ―knowing others‖ and hermeneutical injustice has centered primarily on issues of 
race, and occasionally gender. I want to turn away from these examples to the less-
theorized about group of individuals who identify as disabled. While it is problematic 
at the outset to speak of such a group existing—the definition that we will adopt later 
on when we use terms like ‗disabled community‘ and ‗individuals who identify as 
disabled‘ does not isolate—instead, it squarely locates individuals-in-their-
environments, which is where this paper argues that the concept of disability is 
constructed. So, for our purposes, it will be helpful to make careful reference to a 
disabled community while keeping in mind that there is no such clearly identifiable 
group to which our language points that is similarly recognized by the individuals of 
whom it is constituted. Without a group to make reference to, our ability to say much 
constructive is undoubtedly limited.  Yet acknowledging that there is no singular 
community to speak of (or with) ought not to stand in the way of our coming to a 
proper acknowledgement of disability and the need to attend to singular voices in a 
very particular way.  
87 
 
An ancillary motivation for the choice of this example is the current 
problematic nature of medical information seeking in disabled communities which 
clearly connects this problem with the second major undercurrent of my work—the 
role of biomedical sciences in perpetuating systems of epistemic injustice. This 
example advances the claim that it is not epistemically helpful in every situation to 
gather as much information as possible, in this case, about an individual or group of 
individuals. In fact, it suggests that if you are not sensitive to the role that 
relationships play in making sense of experience—if you think you understand what 
you are, but you do not understand who you are relationally or relative to others—
then you do not truly understand who or what you are at all. By means of this 
example, I will elucidate my conception of hermeneutical injustice, maintaining that 
the disabled community is imbued with unique hermeneutical resources, and that 
attention to dominant discourse‘s conceptions of what it is like to be disabled without 
doing the necessary work of individually combatting hermeneutical injustice by 
sustained interpersonal interaction with members of the disabled community (a 
suggestion and recommendation borrowed from Lugones) dramatically limits our 
understanding. I believe that the completely novel application of Lugones‘s practice 
of world traveling is a possible avenue for undoing the epistemic harm done to these 
communities. And to complicate things further, we need to hold fast to the possibility 
that, when all is said and done, the community of which we speak may not exist 
beyond our delineation of it for the purposes of having this and other conversations 
about it.   
Hermeneutical Injustice  
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In Epistemic Injustice, Miranda Fricker details a number of different epistemic 
behaviors that can lead to the commission of epistemic injustice by one party (or, 
more often, group) on another. These injustices, in all cases, have consequences that 
cut both ways. For example, Fricker‘s discussion of testimonial injustice, reasonably 
so, focuses heavily on how that injustice impacts the party whose testimony is not 
taken credibly, and, indeed, the negative implications for someone who finds 
themselves not taken as a credible source are undoubtedly great. The potential 
negative implications to the individual who commits  such an act of epistemic 
injustice (that is, the person who denies the testimony of another) is only rarely, if 
ever, alluded to by Fricker. I am interested in the influence of the perpetration of 
epistemic injustice that cuts both ways. While the most obvious example of a harm 
done to the perpetrator of injustice is ignorance, it is not at all clear that ignorance 
necessarily amounts to a negative influence—take Mill‘s white ignorance for 
example. Simple ignorance could really be seen as a benefit to the perpetrator of 
epistemic (and ordinary) harm. So instead of exclusive attention to the ignorance that 
results from one individual‘s commission of epistemic harm, I would like to attend to 
the whole spectrum of harms to which they are subjecting themselves. Not taking 
someone‘s testimony, for example, leaves them without information obtainable by 
someone who is willing to value the testimony of another and without that 
individual‘s particular take on what he or she is testifying to.  
While I do explore the epistemic harm done to the perpetrator, which Fricker 
does not spend much time with, I in no way mean to diminish or mitigate harm to the 
sufferer. I think both sets of epistemic harms are worthy of examination, and, in 
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investigating them side-by-side, we might have a privileged perspective from which 
to identify what the epistemic goods are that are being infringed upon in instances of 
hermeneutical injustice (which, for Fricker, has no one perpetrator), especially when 
the harms tend to cut both ways.   
To begin with, however, it first needs to be established what exactly is meant 
by hermeneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when one group‘s 
collective social understanding prevents a second (non-dominant) group from 
forming their own understanding, and (if we allow that they do somehow form an 
understanding) preventing that understanding from being widely shared. Fricker 
writes,  
one way of taking the epistemological suggestion that social power 
has an unfair impact on collective forms of social understanding is 
to think of our shared understandings as reflecting the perspectives 
of different social groups, and to entertain the idea that relations of 
unequal power can skew shared hermeneutical resources so that 
the powerful tend to have appropriate understandings of their 
experiences ready to draw on as they make sense of their social 
experiences, whereas the powerless are more likely to find 
themselves having some social experiences through a glass darkly, 
with at best ill-fitting meanings to draw on in their effort to render 
them intelligible. (148) 
 
We are all the generators of social meaning then, when we turn and use that meaning 
to make sense of our own experience, it should all check out—as this is what we 
designed it to do. Although we indeed generate social meaning, it is not the case that 
said social meaning is readily put to use by us and may instead be imposed on us by 
someone in a position of significant social power.  
Because those of us in positions of social power are the generators of social 
meaning, then, according to Fricker, when we turn and use that meaning to make 
sense of our own experience, it all checks out. On the other hand, when those of us 
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who are not in positions of social power use those same meanings to make sense of 
our own (presumably divergent) experiences, we misinterpret and distort what we can 
in order to find fit, and do away with the rest.  
 Some work needs to be done with respect to what Fricker means when she 
speaks of ―making sense of one‘s own experience.‖ Medina problematizes this 
description of Fricker‘s. Because Fricker couches hermeneutical injustice in terms of 
semantics, she does not adequately take the time to consider the question of to whom 
one is trying to make meaning. It would seem to be the case that on Fricker‘s account, 
it is the individual him or herself who is not able to find meaning. Yet hermeneutical 
injustice only occurs in a relational context. There are numerous players at stake. Of 
course, there is the individual—but there is also the group with whom their 
experience may resonate, the dominant group, and finally, the greater collection of 
these subgroups—the group intended to speak for us on the whole: this is the group 
that institutes and maintains the dominant discourse—where we get our social 
meaning. Yet we can see how meaning has to, in some sense, work its way up the 
hierarchy: first, with individuals making meaning for themselves, then to others like 
them, then to others who may not be so receptive, and ultimately, it can become part 
of dominant discourse, and our meaning can be and is understood by all. Notice that 
the dominant discourse is something that even members of marginalized groups are 
exposed to and likely understand, as they often (and which will be discussed more 
fully shortly) develop a double consciousness which allows them to harbor both their 
own self-conceptions and the dominant discourse‘s conception of themselves 
simultaneously.  
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Fricker, however, uses examples like that of Carmita Wood, a woman who, 
for a long time, had been suffering from work-place sexual harassment but (according 
to Fricker) because there was no recognition of sexual harassment in the dominant 
discourse, did not have appropriate understandings of her experiences (149). Fricker 
writes, ―The cognitive disablement prevents her from understanding a significant 
patch of her own experience: that is, a patch of experience which it is strongly in her 
interest to understand, for without that understanding she is left deeply troubled, 
confused, and isolated […] Her hermeneutical disadvantage renders her unable to 
make sense of her ongoing mistreatment‖ (151).  
Fricker is making two extremely strong claims in this passage: first, that 
Wood does not actually understand an aspect of her own experience; and second, that 
this is not just any aspect, like something accidental or trivial, but an aspect ―of 
experience which it is strongly in her interest to understand‖ (151). No amount of 
exposure to sexual misconduct in the workplace without collective corroboration 
would warrant Wood‘s understanding her own experience. Fricker is not claiming 
that events such as speak-outs would help Wood process her preexisting 
understanding in a way that is more in line with dominant social meaning. Thus, 
Fricker is not saying that Wood, after consciousness raising about sexual harassment, 
has new information about, is aware of, is less susceptible to, or understands better, 
her experiences; she is saying that Wood now understands what she didn‘t before. 
This overreaching on the part of Fricker to make the case for hermeneutical 
injustice has not gone unnoticed by her critics. In Rebecca Mason‘s ―Two Kinds of 
Unknowing,‖ she argues that Fricker‘s use of the example of consciousness raising 
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about sexual harassment fails to demonstrate that there was a lack of prior knowledge. 
On Mason‘s account, it is not the case that women could not understand their 
experiences of sexual harassment before it was named. They knew that something 
was wrong, organized around it, and gave it a name. For Mason, there was this thing 
that they were experiencing before, that they knew they were experiencing before, and 
to it they gave a name. Medina argues in a similar vein that Fricker places too much 
emphasis on the linguistic accomplishment of naming the phenomenon, as though it 
were somehow in this act of naming that an experience achieves meaning.  
The criticism of Fricker on this point by Mason, Medina, myself, and others, 
does not render hermeneutical injustice flat-footed, however. Something much more 
subtle had to transpire for naming, identifying, and appropriately giving meaning to 
such happenings. Before these women came together to share their experiences, they 
likely had the sense that something was wrong, but were at a loss for a way to 
articulate it. Or worse still, each of them thought it was simply something to be taken 
in stride. In either case, though, there was a something of which they were aware. 
There was a knowing without a name. Coming together and finding other voices that 
validated how uncomfortable they felt when these actions were performed toward 
them gave them the power they needed to name the phenomenon, and begin (however 
small) an uprising to push against its unchecked happening against women in the 
workplace. Mason writes, ―affirming that women—prior to naming sexual 
harassment—were able to understand their experiences of it suggests an alternative 
kind of unknowing that is at work when hermeneutical resources fail to countenance 
the experiences of some members of society‖ (298). 
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In sum, then, as long as Fricker allows for the type of meaning making as 
described above by the non-dominant group, the blooms through the cracks in the 
sidewalk, I think that her theory has accurately identified the key players at work here 
in this chapter which will need to be made use of by both the dominant and non-
dominant group. With this picture in mind, then, I take hermeneutical injustice to 
refer to the dominant group‘s ability and inclination to overlook the meaning already 
in place by non-dominant groups and, in so doing, retarding the spread of that 
meaning both across these two groups and amongst members of the non-dominant 
group themselves. This is consistent with Medina‘s desire to identify the ―to whom‖ 
the making sense of an experience is being done. For Medina, and for me, then, 
hermeneutical injustice is a failure of communicative and interpretive responsiveness. 
For this reason, meaning is not taken up by others.  
With an operational definition of hermeneutical injustice in hand, then, it 
would be prudent to turn to the epistemic consequences of such a harm. On Fricker‘s 
account, the primary harm done is to the marginalized. Recall, on Fricker‘s account, 
because we all participate in the dominant discourse and achieve understanding of our 
own experiences via relation to it, subjects of hermeneutical injustice find themselves 
lacking the resources they require to give legitimate voice to their own meaning. This 
is an extreme consequence, and one that we have previously butted heads with. But 
even if we disallow this as a necessary outcome of hermeneutical injustice, there are 
still epistemic consequences for those who are not heard. Clearly, not being able or 
allowed to adequately give voice to your own experience has the potential to 
undermine your sense of epistemic agency. Why is it that nobody is listening? Why is 
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it that you are not being understood? It is easy to see how one might begin to answer 
those questions by attending to features of themselves, not necessarily seeing the 
consequences as a product of their environment. There is something epistemically 
questionable about me, about my experience, about what I am trying to convey and 
how I am trying to convey it. I am not a proper epistemic agent—a generator of 
reliable, intelligible, information.  
This would be a case of epistemic insecurity. However, victims of 
hermeneutical injustice, in some cases, are not pushed so far. In fact, Medina argues 
for a host of epistemic virtues that are more easily accessible to the oppressed 
(although clearly not universally taken up). In this case, a victim of hermeneutical 
injustice who is not pushed to such an extreme is better positioned to have the virtue 
of epistemic humility. While someone with the virtue of epistemic humility when 
confronted with hermeneutical injustice is likely to posit the same questions: ‗Why is 
it that nobody is listening?,‘ ‗Why is it that I am not being understood?,‘ they are not 
necessarily going to jump to the conclusion that they are not legitimate epistemic 
agents. An individual with the virtue of epistemic humility does not necessarily see 
their claims to be authoritative—and in recognizing that this is possible, they are less 
likely to conclude that the claims and positions of others are necessarily 
wrongheaded. This, of course, is only one possibility of epistemic humility—the other 
would be extreme epistemic submissiveness, where one simply backs down to the 
epistemic authority of another. 
In this way, a victim of hermeneutical injustice likewise has the potential to be 
more open-minded regarding the possibilities of what can be said to be epistemically 
95 
 
authoritative. It has long been argued in feminist and critical race theory that victims 
of oppression have ―dual consciousness.‖ That is, they have the ability to see 
themselves through their own eyes, as well as through the eyes of their oppressor. 
Medina writes, ―Although oppressed subjects can indeed fall victim to socially 
generated illusions, they often have more resources to undo these illusions, they have 
a richer (or more heterogeneous) experiential life that they can use to dismantle the 
accepted description of reality and rules of the day‖ (46).  While Medina is quick to 
give voice to at least this benefit of epistemic humility, there are other benefits worth 
noting. For example, those who are epistemically humble are much better at seeing 
through the illusions of privilege as positions of privilege are generally locked in by 
an unwillingness to see things any other way than that which suits them whereas an 
epistemically humble individual is practiced at entertaining perspectives which might 
render the privileged less comfortably situated.  
This ability to navigate amongst multiple social cognitive constructions puts 
the oppressed at something of an epistemic advantage. They have the dominant 
cognitive construct very much forced upon them, yet are able to better understand 
themselves both as participants in dominant discourse (exposing them to how they are 
perceived by the oppressor) and as individuals, however unfortunately, outside of the 
dominant discourse (hermeneutically oppressed). Fricker‘s rendering of 
hermeneutical injustice does not as readily allow for this dual or multiple 
consciousness. I regard this fact as something of a drawback of her account.   
Recall that, for Fricker, whenever we encounter a hermeneutical gap, an 
experience must be rendered unintelligible for everybody. In contrast, on Medina‘s 
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reading, this is not necessarily the case. When the dominant interpretation fails to 
recognize and interpret an experience, seemingly divergent individuals—individuals 
whose experiences are being overlooked or individuals who are being made aware of 
this failure of recognition—can begin to engage in what he calls ―hermeneutical 
resistance‖ (100). In contrast to Fricker‘s contention, he writes, ―public silences, even 
when they do involve unfair hermeneutical disadvantages should not be equated with 
complete expressive and interpretive incapacity‖ (101).   
   
What it is like to be disabled 
The collective social understanding does not simply belong to the dominant 
group. Attention to how the collective social understanding operates across the 
dominant/non-dominant divide, even if it is borne out of the attitudes of the dominant 
group, as in the case of white ignorance, we create meaning that can be utilized by 
both groups all the same. In considering how dominant discourse views disabled 
individuals we‘ll start by developing a conception of what it means to be disabled 
borrowed from the dominant discourse. Once this is in place, we will be in a position 
to challenge it with the work of disabled theorists themselves.  
 This example poses a particularly poignant challenge to my work for two 
reasons: first, the practice of medicine is a leading contributor to the hermeneutical 
injustice suffered by this community and, because attempts were made to understand 
rather than ignore (though the average person tends to do more of the latter), the 
malicious or at least innocuous intentions inherent in most other cases of 
hermeneutical injustice are not as obvious a factor. If damage is done by someone 
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seeking knowledge responsibly versus underhandedly, epistemic harm still may have 
occurred and, as such, investigation of both varieties stand to inform and enlighten 
our inquiry. In this case, because (at least some of) the intentions of the medical 
community were beneficent, my inclination to explore the epistemic harm to the 
perpetrator seems less inappropriate than it often does elsewhere, even if Fricker 
protests such an analysis. The second and final reason this example poses a special 
challenge is that the traditional roads tread for breaking down incommensurability 
between two groups and their respective understandings have not been extensively 
tested here—that is, there has not been nearly as much theorizing about how able-
bodied individuals can or should come to know what it is like to be disabled—and, 
for this reason, novel information will be gleaned from the application of this 
understanding regarding whether or not it turns out to be viable resources for doing 
so.     
Before we can talk about fixing the problem of hermeneutical injustice 
suffered by the disabled, however, we first need to set out what the problem is. We 
have thus far spent a good deal of time on the problem of hermeneutical injustice in 
general, but we have yet to move to the particularities of this case. I want to start by 
laying out some knowledge claims about the disabled. Much of this, as mentioned 
previously, originates with medicine, but our ultimate aim is to identify key elements 
of our social understanding of disability. From this, we can identify any inaccuracies, 
lapses, or pervasive misconceptions that are not present in our brief review of 
accounts from disability theory itself. Even if we unearth a mismatch—we have not 
yet demonstrated that we have isolated a case of hermeneutical injustice. To do so, we 
98 
 
must push further to determine whether it is the dominant social construction of 
disability that is keeping an understanding of disability stemming from disability 
theory itself at bay (which I believe it has and is). After establishing this instance of 
hermeneutical injustice, we will turn to the work of Maria Lugones, Ofelia Schutte, 
Jose Medina, and others as a means of identifying the epistemic goods recoverable 
from disrupting this particular instance of hermeneutical injustice.  
Any restriction on or lack (resulting from an impairment) of ability 
to perform an activity in a manner or within the range considered 
normal for a human being. World Health Organization (WHO) 
definition of ‗disability‘ 
 
In a review of recent scholarship in feminist disability studies, Thompson 
(2005) briefly delineates five narratives of disability (11). The first of these she deems 
the ―biomedical narrative.‖ This is probably the depiction of disability we are most 
familiar with. The biomedical narrative demonstrates disability as the malfunctioning 
or malformation of the human body, due to some disease or defect. Physicians are 
esteemed as experts and are heralded as ―cognitive authorities,‖ even outside of their 
practice (117). You would presume that there is good reason, then, to follow their 
lead—especially when we are speaking of disability with an understanding that it is a 
medical condition. (We will return shortly, however, to the dangers of unchecked 
reliance on physicians and medical information/ways of knowing.) 
There are a number of implications stemming from this view of disability. 
First, there is the tendency to generalize disabilities for the purpose of treatment 
(Wendell 71). While a doctor might be treating two different patients, both of whom 
suffer from Multiple Sclerosis, the extent to which these two patients may or may not 
be disabled can vary widely. As such, a doctor may not be inclined to refer to a 
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patient‘s diagnosis and then qualify it with the expression of symptoms x, y, and z, 
and further specify the degree to which the patient is suffering from each of these 
maladies. We must hope that this is, at the very least, characteristic of the physician‘s 
personal notes on each patient, but we can see why classing patients simply by 
diagnosis is an obvious starting point, particularly if we consider this as a function of 
physicians acting as medical researchers. Unfortunately, this behavior on the part of 
doctors has bled into the general public‘s use of terminology surrounding what may 
be a diagnosis for a very specific condition as something of a catch-all term.  
A second consequence of the biomedical view of disability is the notion that 
medicine is meant to control or treat our disabilities (and subsequently, that 
disabilities are meant to be controlled). Susan Wendell writes, ―Scientific medicine 
participates in and fosters the myth of control by focusing overwhelmingly on cures 
and lifesaving medical interventions‖ yet, in the same paragraph, she iterates that 
physicians do not demonstrate modesty in either their own knowledge or in their 
field‘s ability to produce desired results even in response to their failures (94). This is, 
of course, troubling on two fronts. First, it presumes that something is wrong that is in 
desperate need of fixing. There is a paradigm into which human bodies should fit, and 
when they do not fit that paradigm, it is the body that needs to be ―fixed‖ rather than 
the paradigm. And given our advanced medical technology, there is a great deal of 
―fixing‖ we are able to do: cochlear implants; surgical ―stretching‖ of limbs (this 
amounts to literally severing, spacing, and resetting bones repeatedly); prosthetics; 
anything we can do to make an aberrant body or condition more representative of the 
paradigm. This fosters the attitude that the human form is something we can and 
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should have close control over—and we should utilize that control for 
―improvements.‖ Second, as Wendell mentions, even in the face of their own failure, 
physicians are reluctant to give up this illusion and aspiration of control. If a 
particular method of treatment is unsuccessful, it is not the case that physicians are 
inclined to throw in the towel. Rather, they may make repeated attempts at the same 
treatment measures, or explore a plethora of potential remedies with the undergirding 
impulse that something, anything, can and should be done.  
This draws out the distinction between two foundational principles with which 
health care professionals are intended to operate in biomedical ethics. The principles 
of non-maleficence and beneficence. While more often than not functioning in unison 
with one another and endorsing the same actions, the principle of non-maleficence 
constitutes the vow with which the Hippocratic Oath opens: first, do no harm. In 
cases such as those described above, where the desire to help—the inclination toward 
beneficence—begins to overshadow a physician‘s duty of non-maleficence, a doctor 
may in fact be causing harm in their seemingly innocuous attempt to help. In the 
pursuit of control and remedy mainly, we can assume, motivated by beneficence 
(although the desire to push medical boundaries and practice investigatory medicine 
may, too, be in play) the primary duty of non-maleficence can take an unintentional 
backseat.  
One cannot ignore at this juncture the ability of medical technology to detect 
certain disabilities in utero: for example, hydrocephaly or trisomy 13. With the 
advancement in the prenatal detection of anomalies, we have had corresponding 
improvements in our ability to ―fix‖ certain conditions by means of prenatal surgery 
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as well as increases in incidences of genetic abortion. In fact, two conditions that have 
been ―targeted for extinction‖ include spina bifida and Down syndrome by our 
increased ability to detect them prenatally and early enough to abort if the woman or 
family chooses to do so.  
This language of being ―targeted for extinction‖ is undeniably startling, and 
one can imagine what impact hearing this fact might have on an individual suffering 
from either of these conditions. What is not meant by this language and 
corresponding initiative is to do harm to existing individuals with these conditions 
(yet ancillary harm is indeed done in that resources (both financial and with respect to 
medical research) that may have been directed at improving their living conditions are 
becoming increasingly scarce, and, with fewer individuals being born afflicted with 
the condition, even fewer resources will be allocated to this cause in the future). 
Instead, prenatal genetic testing is being used to detect developing fetuses with these 
conditions at which point women are given the option of having a genetic abortion 
performed. At this juncture, this choice remains the woman‘s, yet nearly 75% of 
women who learn that they are carrying a baby with Down syndrome elect to abort. 
With such a high rate of termination, and given the fact that Down syndrome is a 
spectrum disorder (that is, although it can be prenatally detected, it cannot be 
prenatally determined how severely the child will be affected by the condition, and 
many individuals with Down syndrome go on to live fulfilling, independent lives) one 
might question the nature of the freedom with which this ―choice‖ is exercised. 
Similarly, individuals with spina bifida (a congenital condition resulting from 
the improper fusing of the neural tube and spinal column in the early weeks of 
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pregnancy) live lives that are colored very differently by their condition. While spina 
bifida is an undeniably painful and dangerous condition—making the individual 
prone to disease and infection and generally requiring multiple surgeries, beginning in 
infancy—notable individuals suffering from this condition, such as Alison Davis go 
on to live productive and, to them, satisfactory lives (285). Davis was born with spina 
bifida in an era when there were no prenatal tests to detect this condition. Her 
physicians told her parents that her quality of life would be very poor, and that it 
would be in everyone‘s best interest not to treat her condition (and presumably allow 
her to die from complications such as infection). Her parents did not take the advice 
of her physicians, and Davis was subjected to innumerable surgical operations 
throughout her life beginning shortly after birth, and was still left paralyzed and 
incontinent. Yet Davis composed an article in defense of children born with similar 
conditions against having their quality of life predicted for them by physicians 
immediately after birth. Although she was physically affected by her condition, Davis 
went on to achieve advanced degrees and participate in what she takes to be a life 
worthy of living. She argues that the doctors misinformed her parents about her 
potential quality of life and warns that such a thing cannot necessarily be predicted so 
early in life for conditions such as hers.  
In our increasingly technologically focused and highly 
specialized healthcare arena, there continues to be a 
systemic concern that subjective experience is 
unscientific and thus unreliable in knowledge creation 
in medicine, particularly when it conflicts with expert 
opinions. Those who report a much higher quality of 
life than projected by experts are often discredited as 
mistaken or holding lower expectations due to their 
impairments. (Anita Ho, 114) 
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While it is the case that, for certain conditions, such as Tay-Sachs,  a short, 
miserable quality of life can be accurately predicted, and this is a condition that 
parents can be screened for being carriers of prior to even conceiving a child together 
(as it is a recessive disease and both individuals must be carriers in order for the 
condition to manifest), for others, including the two previously mentioned which are 
being ―targeted for extinction,‖ quality of life, particularly quality of life from the 
perspective of the child cannot be predicted with great accuracy. So physicians are 
making recommendations to prospective parents based on definite information that 
their child will suffer from an impairment, but only probabilistic information, if that, 
regarding the child‘s potential quality of life. And when doctors are viewed as 
authority figures by these prospective parents, the decision to terminate a pregnancy 
may be heavily influenced by that doctor, and the medical community‘s, opinion of 
the potential quality of life for an individual born with either of these two conditions. 
Given that these are conditions that are indeed ―targeted for extinction,‖ it is not 
difficult to suppose that these opinions are overtly negative ones.  
[…] numerous studies show that health care 
professionals continue to hold negative attitudes and 
assumptions toward impairments and the quality of life 
of people living with these impairments. Reported 
negative attitudes raise questions of whether these 
patients can take professionals‘ proclaimed good will 
for granted. The medical model for disability, which 
continues to be the paradigm among many clinicians, 
pathologizes experiences of patients with impairments 
and neglects how social barriers and professional 
attitudes have the potential to affect quality of life. 
Anita Ho, 113 
 
The final implication of the biomedical narrative of disability is that disabled 
individuals themselves can be influenced by these perceptions. In describing 
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symptoms to their physician, for instance, they may lapse into terminology 
characteristic of their condition generally rather than trying to give an accurate, 
subjective account of their experience. If patients are unable to communicate 
effectively to their doctors, they may well not get the individualized treatment they 
need for their condition as it affects them specifically; they may be prevented from 
receiving the equipment and accommodations they need to lead their life with as little 
hindrance as possible (Wendell, 133). But, because they may be operating from the 
concern that, if the manifestation as they describe it is not generically descriptive of 
their condition, they may get no diagnosis or treatment at all, they may be more 
inclined to ―stick to the script,‖ as it were. Anita Ho warns that ―[w]hen professionals 
and patients identify different symptoms as salient and have divergent interpretations 
of various experiences, in determining appropriate care plans professionals‘ 
interpretation and assessment of them even often trump the patient‘s own situated 
experience based on the presumed credibility gap‖ (114).  
The second narrative pointed to by Garland-Thompson (2005) is the 
sentimental narrative. On this view, persons with disabilities are seen as ―occasions 
for narcissistic pity or lessons in suffering for those who imagine themselves as non-
disabled‖ (11). The sentimental narrative, whether overtly or covertly, has probably 
occurred to you, even if only as a child. Consider the scenario of being stopped at a 
red light in your car. As the light begins to change from red to green, you watch in 
pity as a young man with cerebral palsy struggles to cross the intersection on 
crutches. (And why not: imagine it is a slushy February day in Minnesota.) What 
emotions does this scenario elicit for you? For me, I am inclined to feel sorry for this 
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young man. I pity his condition, his plight. I wish that I could help knowing full well 
that I am not positioned to do so (behind the wheel of my car), nor would I be likely 
too, even if I were better positioned to help, such as if I were crossing the street on 
foot in tandem. There is something that makes us feel uncomfortable about offering 
assistance to the disabled and, I believe, it is in part a product of the sentimental 
narrative of disability. In offering help to someone with a disability we would be 
reinforcing our own conception of that person as someone who is necessarily 
dependent on others. Offering help in accomplishing an ordinary task could be an 
occasion for shame for that individual. Feeling sorry for someone who is disabled 
inhibits our inclination to help because helping reveals that we feel sorry for them in 
the first place.  Many of us who are able-bodied find it difficult enough to accept help 
(or charity, or pity) from others—even if we need it but it is the case that being 
offered help or charity makes us acutely aware of our potential shortcomings, and this 
can incur feelings of shame even when there is nothing ―wrong.‖ In returning to the 
case of disability, Wendell echoes, ―Disabilities tend to be associated with tragic loss, 
weakness, passivity, dependency, helplessness, shame, and global incompetence‖ 
(63). 
The third narrative identified by Garland-Thompson (2005) is one in which 
disability is something that is meant to be overcome. This view necessarily renders 
disability a personal defect that must be compensated for to get along in the 
environment. While a positive note rings through this narrative (even though it still 
suggests that disabilities are ―problems‖ in need of ―fixing‖), its sound is deadened by 
the ominous note of its companion: on the view that disabilities are something we are 
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meant to overcome, we must too be imbued with the resources to carry out that aim. 
While providing resources for individuals to overcome their disabilities might not at 
first sound so onerous, it begins to if you consider some of the attitudes that are 
commonly linked to providing said resources.  
In a quite different sense of disability, according to Linton (1998), it is 
common to view the disabled is as a drain on precious societal resources such as 
healthcare, education, and housing. The way in which spina bifida and Down 
syndrome are being ―targeted for extinction‖ is both a product of this view and, as 
mentioned previously, is having and will have a significant impact on the resources 
being allocated to treat individuals with these conditions. While it might not seem so 
nasty at the outset to suggest that a disability is something that should be overcome, 
even with its inherent undertone of a disability thereby being an undesirable personal 
defect, the suggestion that money spent on helping individuals overcome their 
disabilities is done so unwisely and inappropriately surely highlights the way in 
which the narrative of overcoming has inherently negative underpinnings.   
The fourth is the narrative of catastrophe (Thompson 2005). On this picture, 
disability is something so overwhelming that it either brings about courage (and 
possibly shifts you into the former narrative) or causes a devastating physical and 
emotional defeat (and perhaps instead lands us back in the sentimental narrative). 
Either result of the playing out of this narrative steers us away from the potential view 
that disability is something that is not a cause for crisis—that disability can merely 
render someone in need of adaptive strategies to lead an otherwise ordinary life.   
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The narrative of catastrophe from the perspective of an able-bodied individual 
is, in my opinion, easily established, although this does not make it necessarily 
correct or somehow more defensible. Consider, for example, giving birth to a child 
with an unanticipated disability. While all of your life-planning may have centered on 
the overwhelming disruption of bringing an infant into your world, it was surely not 
centered around having a wheelchair accessible nursery or ―baby-proofing‖ your 
home for an child that perhaps can‘t literally even see to avoid the hazards of wall-
sockets. Although I have never experienced what this would be like as a parent, I can 
imagine that one might feel completely devastated and out of control—that one would 
view this event as catastrophic. I can also imagine a parent who, perhaps instantly 
(although I cannot see myself reacting in this way), responds with great strength and 
an emboldened motivation for immediately and dramatically altering her own life, 
and preparing to alter the life that she may have had planned for her child to 
compensate as best as possible for this unexpected modification.  
I can also imagine the narrative of catastrophe falling out of the experience of 
an able-bodied individual becoming disabled. For example, in the case of Donald 
(Dax) Cowart, this, average, healthy young man in his twenties was subjected to 
second and third degree burns covering the majority of his body after an accidental 
explosion (69). Initially so overcome with the pain, Dax requested that his treatment 
be stopped and he be allowed to die. When his request was repeatedly denied, Dax 
began to realize the condition in which he would live the rest of his life: completely 
blind, without sensation over much of his body, without fingers, and without the 
normal function of his arms and wrists. Dax‘s reaction was to sink into a deep 
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depression, characterized by suicidal thoughts. He went from being a young man 
poised for a career in the Air Force to seeing himself as capable of doing no more 
than ―selling pencils on the street corner.‖ Dax‘s response to his disability was in-line 
with the catastrophe narrative—and his resultant attitude was one of defeat and 
desperation.  
Ultimately, Dax completed law school, passed the bar exam, and became an 
extremely successful attorney, even given his physical limitations. Yet he still 
maintains that, although their ―hearts were in the right place,‖ Dax‘s physicians were 
wrong to deny him his request to discontinue treatment. His argument hinges on the 
contention that, no matter a patient‘s condition—if they are deemed psychologically 
competent (which he was, by two separate psychiatrists) their medical decisions 
should be honored and, despite his ultimate success, he should have been allowed to 
die). So, in Dax‘s case, we see the manifestation of the narrative of catastrophe and, 
ultimately, the winning out of the reaction of ―desperation,‖ yet the occurrence of 
courage in Dax‘s achievement of a life beyond what he imagined possible for himself. 
In this way we see the narrative of catastrophe challenged by Dax‘s case. 
The final narrative (Thompson, 2005) identifies disability as something that 
we can and should avoid at all costs. The term, ‗abjection‘ means to discard or cast 
out. This reading of the fifth narrative is consistent with one of the most pervasive 
practices regarding the disabled both across history and time. According to Linton 
(1998), the view of the disabled person as ―the pariah‖ is common to nearly every 
culture, and practices surrounding this view even occur contemporarily (38). Viewing 
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disabled individuals in this light has led to countless horrific acts including their 
isolation, abuse, and even murder.  
Historically, in western culture, people with disabilities have been 
institutionalized. While the conditions of these institutions progressively improved 
with time, the attitude that people with disabilities should be ―managed‖ and kept out 
of the general public was pervasive all the way through the mid-twentieth century. 
Currently, the institutionalization of persons with disabilities is less common, and 
families are encouraged to live with and care for disabled family members, and in 
most cases with financial and medical assistance. Yet abuse of the disabled, even by 
family members, still occurs—and at higher rates than we might anticipate or want to 
admit. Finally, although it is no longer/not a part of western culture to murder 
disabled individuals, we have already explored contemporary attitudes toward genetic 
abortion. Even amongst those with convictions which we‘d ordinarily expect to be 
most staunchly opposed to the termination of life—natural law theorists—by way of 
the principle of double effect, room has been made in the most severe cases of 
suffering, to allow for merciful termination of life. 
Through the fleshing out of these five narratives, we have achieved a brief 
glimpse into the dominant-group‘s social understanding of disability, or what it is 
like, what it means to be disabled. According to how the dominant discourse is meant 
to operate, this is the understanding of what it means to be disabled that ―works‖ if 
we ever do become disabled, or have close encounters with individuals who are, for 
this is to be the correct social understanding. In laying out these narratives, I have 
explored the way in which they more or less ring true even for me when approached 
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uncritically and yet we are still faced with the question of whether or not we‘ve 
gotten it right. That is, do these narratives capture the social understanding of 
disability that we would find in the non-dominant group? 
The short answer is no. Each of these five narratives of disability are currently 
being debunked by work in disability studies. Let‘s take a closer look at a few of 
these cases: To begin with, there has been significant push back on a biomedical 
conception of disability. This has been the prevailing understanding of disability for 
centuries but fails to properly situate disability, as it locates disability squarely in the 
individual. At the very least, disability needs to be seen as the interaction of societal, 
social, and individual factors. It might seem reasonable to conclude that being 4‘1‘‘ is 
a disability. But if it turns out that cars and houses are built for people who are less 
than five feet tall, and that the average height of a full-grown man is only 4‘8‘‘, you 
would probably think twice. This kind of thinking relocates disability and places it in 
a wider (albeit still spatial) context.  
Garland-Thomson argues for an alteration in the very language we use when 
speaking of disability to fully drive this point home. She argues that the ―traditional 
understandings of disability as lack, excess, or flaw in bodies‖ [emphasis added] gets 
it wrong (591). This understanding is a product of the biomedical narrative of 
disability. She argues for an understanding of the relationship between a biological 
impairment and disability to mirror the relationship developed by feminist theorists in 
separating out the difference between sex and gender (591). The term ‗sex‘ refers to 
the biological status of our bodies. That is, whether we have male or female 
reproductive and secondary sex-linked biological structures. If an individual has a 
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vagina, uterus, ovaries, fallopian tubes, mammary glands, a female pelvis, or some 
combination thereof, then they are biologically sexed ‗female.‘ Yet there is no 
necessarily causal link between being biologically sexed female and being of the 
female gender. That is because being gendered female is a social construct. It says 
something about part of our social identity, not necessarily something about our 
biological sex. Being gendered female is a social construct, and it is an identity. 
Society has created gendered roles and individuals participate in them in any number 
of ways; but it is not the case that simply because one‘s sex is female, their gender is 
correspondingly so.  
In the same way, we should understand the term ‗impairment‘ to refer to some 
biological fact about our bodies. This term might refer to damaged occipital lobes, a 
severed or obstructed spinal cord, a degenerative disease, the presence of an extra or 
absence of a standard chromosome, or a physical stature above or below three or 
more standard deviations of the norm. An individual could have any one of these 
biological characteristics, a combination thereof, or one or more of thousands of 
potential others. Having such a feature would make you biologically impaired. 
However, it is not the case that having a biological impairment constitutes having a 
disability, in the same way that being biologically sexed female does not mean you 
are of the female gender. For Garland-Thompson, being disabled is a social construct 
and a social identity. It is a fact about how our biological impairments do or do not 
render us ―unfit‖ for our environment. For example, having damaged cochlear 
structures is a biological impairment. This biological impairment may render 
someone unable to hear. In a society where there is no relevant audible information, 
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this person is not disabled. In a society where there is, this person is considered 
disabled because a biological impairment renders them improperly ―fit‖ for their 
environment. To be unable to hear is to be deaf. To be deaf is a feature of your social 
identity. In a hearing community, it renders you disabled. In the Deaf Community, it 
does not. Disabilities are therefore social constructs. They are the coming together of 
a biological impairment and a societal fact and if there is a ―misfit,‖ that is, if the 
biological impairment renders that individual unable to operate in some common and 
relevant way in society, then that person is disabled—and being disabled is a feature 
of their social identity.  
As I mentioned previously, Garland-Thompson urges us to adopt this 
language of ‗misfits‘ or ‗misfitting‘ in lieu of ‗disabled.‘ This language has imbedded 
in it a necessarily relational connotation. It does not make sense to talk about 
something fitting or misfitting if there is nothing that we are worried about fitting it 
into. Adopting the term ‗misfit‘ for people who socially identify as disabled requires 
that we consider this relational aspect. It requires that we take in to account the 
context in which we consider people with disabilities, rather than just viewing 
disability as some physical or biological fact about them—abstracted or abstractable 
from their location. One distinctively helpful feature of this position is that, ―the 
utility of the concept of misfit is that it lodges injustice and discrimination in the 
materiality of the world more than in societal attitudes or representational practices, 
even while it recognizes their mutually constituting entanglement‖ (593). 
I think that this is absolutely right. It is right to recognize disability as a social 
construct and as a feature of social identity. The use of the term misfit enforces this 
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fact and, moreover, it places special emphasis on features of the material world and 
how those features might constitute or contribute to this identity. While emphasizing 
the material world, we deemphasize the role of the body in isolation, yet we do not 
lose sight of the fact that the material world is a product of societal attitudes and vice 
versa. So even though discrimination against people with disabilities is very much 
imbedded in the material world, it is still a feature of our social attitudes because our 
social attitudes construct the material world and the material world influences our 
social attitudes.  
We may have made it the case that a building is not wheelchair accessible; yet 
we don‘t get any discriminatory sense from this until we see how this feature of the 
building prohibits certain others from entering. When we see how these prohibitions 
limit individuals from participating we start to see discrimination, and we may start to 
validate this discrimination (we should not have to accommodate) or we may begin to 
dismantle it (wheelchair accommodation is necessary). Being disabled is a social 
identity that says something about the way you fit or do not fit in the world that 
society has constructed, the world is constructed by society discriminatorily, and the 
way in which society reacts to seeing how the world discriminates can begin to feed 
or dismantle this discrimination.  
Tobin Siebers urges us in this same direction and writes, ―Disability is not a 
physical or mental defect but a cultural and minority identity. To call disability an 
identity is to recognize that it is not a biological or natural property but an elastic 
social category both subject to social control and effecting social change‖ (4). So, in 
the very same way that my participating in the social category of ‗woman,‘ works to 
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delineate the minority group associated with the name, disability ought to be similarly 
seen as what makes us ―others.‖).   
‗Otherness‘ is maintained by culture but also limits 
culture profoundly. Canadian and United States culture 
rarely include people with disabilities in their 
depictions of ordinary daily life, and they exclude 
struggles, thoughts, and feelings from any shared 
cultural understanding of human experience. This tends 
to make people with disabilities feel invisible (except 
when they are made hypervisible in their symbolic roles 
as heroes or tragic victims), and it deprives the non-
disabled of the knowledge and perspectives that people 
with disabilities could contribute to culture, including 
how to live well with mental limitations and suffering. 
Because disabled people‘s experience is not integrated 
into the culture, most newly disabled people know little 
or nothing about how to live with a long-term or life-
threatening illness, how to communicate with doctors 
and nurses and medical bureaucrats about their 
problems, how to live with limitation, uncertainty, pain, 
and other symptoms when doctors cannot make them 
go away. Nor do they have any idea that they may gain 
something from their experiences of disability. There is 
a cultural gulf between the disabled and the non-
disabled; to become disabled is to enter a different 
world. Yet experiences of living with a disability are 
not by their nature private, separable from the rest of 
life and separable from the rest of society. They can and 
should be shared throughout the culture as much as we 
share experiences of love, work, and family life. 
(Wendell 65-66)  
 
From a handful of the contemporary forerunners of disability studies, then, we 
get a social understanding that is distinctly different than the understanding gleaned 
from the narratives present in the dominant-group. Moreover, in both Sieben and 
Wendell it is suggested that the operation of the dominant group‘s social 
understanding is interfering with a proper social conception of disability. For both 
Sieben and Garland-Thompson, we need to move past the biophysical and into the 
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social, and for Wendell, we need to recognize the role of culture in obscuring the 
plain facts of disability. In both cases, we see evidence of hermeneutical injustice. 
The dominant social understanding of disability allows no room for the non-
dominant. The non-dominant social understanding is there, but it is not receiving the 
proper attention or the necessary resources to have its convictions laid plain to 
epistemic others.  
Cultivating hermeneutical justice 
Given that there is meaning available to us from the perspective of the 
disabled, we need to go about articulating a way in which this meaning can be 
respectfully accessed. Attention to the dominant narratives of disability are giving us, 
at best,  an inaccurate picture of what it is like to be disabled and, at worst, a 
discriminatory and harmful one—even if the bare intentions are precisely to make 
sense of these experiences or to improve them. In either case, we are imposing our 
own sense of these experiences and, in so doing, are silencing an articulation of these 
experiences from an extraordinarily privileged standpoint: the position from which 
they are experienced. While it may seem like we have some prima facie good reasons 
for preferring an account from an outsider‘s perspective (such as in the case of the 
expert opinion of a physician) over a subjective account, upon closer scrutiny, we 
have demonstrated that these accounts are not to be automatically and 
unproblematically understood as superior to subjective accounts.  Anita Ho writes,  
In attempting to acquire a fuller appreciation of the state of affairs, 
we need to acknowledge that the patients are the ones who are 
likely most knowledgeable about what their impairments and 
various clinical and nonclinical management strategies mean to 
them—they may be ―experts‖ in that regard. Clinical expertise in 
assessing various conditions, while important in promoting 
medical care and sound policies, is only part of the story. It is only 
when we also incorporate patients‘ perspectives or assessment of 
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their situations that we can ascertain appropriate care plans and 
practice guidelines. (119) 
 
There are, thus, practical implications for our ―getting it right,‖ along with key 
epistemic implications. We must extend the applicability of Ho‘s claim beyond the 
realm of patients, however, as disability does not necessarily link up with disease and 
disabled individuals, therefore, are not all to be understood as patients.  
 The epistemic consequences of the sustained commission of hermeneutical 
injustice by dominant groups are extensive. Without a proper recognition of what the 
world is like to a socially marginalized other, members of the dominant group can 
suffer from a lack of curiosity (Medina, 33). As a product of there being aspects of 
reality that one need not explore (e.g. the experiences of marginalized others) because 
one is in the dominant group one may not develop any curiosity about what goes on 
in those overlooked territories. Such a lack of curiosity can lead to the vice of 
epistemic laziness; only the things that come easily to us are the things worth 
knowing (Medina, 33). Knowledge gleaned from the easiest method of our acquiring 
it is the only knowledge worth having. And finally, those in privileged epistemic 
positions can be epistemically arrogant (Medina, 32). The knowledge one has (the 
knowledge already limited by a lack of curiosity and epistemic laziness) is preferable 
and authoritative.  To recap, the key epistemic consequence for the oppressed is 
severe epistemic insecurity: a misguided opinion of their epistemic agency suggesting 
their intellectual inferiority (Medina, 41).  
 From either standpoint, then, we have good reason to look for an effective 
method for dismantling instances of hermeneutical injustice and reducing or 
eliminating the epistemic vices it promotes for both parties. At this point, however, 
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we must return to the question of whether we have an individual obligation to do so. I 
have already argued that, as a member of an oppressed minority, one would not 
necessarily have such an obligation—although they may indeed have an interest or 
desire. I will now argue that individual members of the dominant group do have an 
obligation to rectify hermeneutical injustice when and where they encounter it.  
 Recall that, for Fricker, there are no individual responsible parties in the 
commission of hermeneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice is a product of the 
operation of the dominant discourse‘s understanding of a minority group‘s experience 
in such a way that their experience is not properly understood. We all, whether 
members of the dominant group or not (have to) make use of the dominant 
discourse‘s understanding of a phenomenon to make sense of our experiences. If the 
dominant discourse is all that we are operating with, however, and we are not 
receiving any input from minority groups, then we are not in a position to develop an 
appropriately robust sense of self which would then include information about what 
we are like from alternative perspectives. In the case of minority experiences, 
however, it can lead to hermeneutical injustice. But the dominant discourse is, in part, 
an epistemic byproduct of unjust systems of oppression operating in our society. 
There is, therefore, on Fricker‘s account, no one responsible party for a case of 
hermeneutical injustice. Even if we reduce it to the consideration of a single member 
of the dominant group misunderstanding, overlooking, or minimizing of the 
experience of a single member of an oppressed minority‘s experience—that one 
individual is not in any way culpable for their inability to understand the other‘s 
experience. Both parties are acted upon by the dominant discourse‘s ability or 
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inability to account for that experience. It is not that person‘s fault they do not 
understand. Fault and responsibility properly lie at the level of society on the whole. 
 Failure to claim individual responsibility for our epistemic location is 
unjustifiable. Yes, as members of the dominant group, we may have cultivated a set 
of epistemic vices that makes it the case that committing hermeneutical injustice is 
likely. And it may not (likely is not) our fault that we happen to be members of the 
dominant group. But by being a member of the dominant group, we are only more 
likely to develop these vices. We cannot make a universal claim that all members of 
the dominant group are epistemically arrogant. In that way, even though it is 
impossible not to be influenced by dominant discourse (no matter your social 
location), it is not the case that you bear no responsibility for epistemic arrogance if 
you have it. If we take Fricker‘s view—the absence of hermeneutical resources 
amongst the non-dominant group in the first place—then to hold someone 
accountable for their arrogance would be unreasonable, in that there is nothing for 
them to be excluding and, in so doing, bolstering their own interpretation of the 
circumstances and thus developing arrogance. In the same way moral virtues are 
cultivated—by keen self-awareness and habituation—so too are intellectual virtues. 
We are responsible for our own self-awareness and we are responsible for our own 
regimen of practicing virtuous acts until they become second nature. In that way, we 
are each individually responsible for hermeneutical injustice at the societal level. By 
taking individual responsibility and enacting change, we can, in the same way, begin 
to dismantle it. By disallowing individual culpability and responsibility we endorse an 
attitude of accepting the status quo. Societal change must still begin with the 
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individual, and with an understanding of society usurping responsibility, individual 
change is unlikely to manifest. Similar to the bystander effect in psychology, where 
individuals are not motivated to action because they assume, with so many others 
observing, surely someone else will intervene—in the case of hermeneutical injustice, 
we cannot allow the individual to assume it is the responsibility of another to take 
action simply because so many are involved. Doing so perpetuates inaction and, 
therefore, perpetuates injustice. For Medina, as long as we are involved, we are 
perpetrators (111). With this contention, I wholeheartedly agree.  
 As members of the dominant group, what, then, is our individual 
responsibility to undermine hermeneutical injustice? How can we best combat this 
phenomenon? The core problem of hermeneutical injustice is not being able to 
understand what it is like for an epistemically located other. Because hermeneutical 
injustice is the product of a system of general oppression, it is only through sustained, 
often uncomfortable, interpersonal contact with the epistemic other that we can 
overcome it. We must therefore leave the comfort of our epistemically privileged 
positions and enter into the worlds of oppressed others. We must enter their worlds in 
a particular way: one that invites the same vulnerability they experience when 
entering our world. This vulnerability is characterized by having one‘s identity at 
least in part defined by the ways in which you are viewed by others. If we are unable 
or unwilling to attend to differences, then we are not in a position to understand 
ourselves completely. In order to have more complete self-knowledge, we need to 
know something about ourselves relationally. Medina writes, 
In our communicative interactions we must make room for 
eccentric voices and we must respond to their nonstandard ways of 
entering into communicative dynamics. Being hermeneutically 
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open means being alert and sensitive to eccentric voices and styles 
as well as to nonstandard meanings and interpretive perspectives. 
(114) 
 
In a groundbreaking piece entitled, ―Have we got a theory for you!,‖ Maria 
Lugones and Elizabeth Spelman speak back and forth and in unison to begin to 
articulate what is wrong with (at the time, predominantly white) women‘s feminist 
theorizing for women of other oppressed minority identities. In this case Lugones 
attempts to articulate the problem of feminist theorizing for Hispanic women. While 
feminist theorizing was born out of the desire of women to be heard, to have their 
experiences understood in an androcentric society, in so doing, it made some initial 
missteps in lumping the experiences of women together. It is clearly not the case that 
in society at large the experiences of all are properly expressed or can be understood 
by way of generalization, yet this is a problem within minority communities as well. 
The problem seemed to be that white feminist theory had the same impact on women 
of other minority identities that androcentric theorizing had on women. We can see 
this problem becoming a stumbling block for our case of interest as well: how can we 
speak of those who socially identify as disabled as having a unified voice? While 
their general engagement with this identity allows us to speak of them as a group, it is 
impossible to make the claim that people who are disabled in different ways or to 
different degrees share the same experience—and even if their disabilities are the 
same, we cannot know for certain that they have ascribed the same social meaning to 
them.  
This problem of generalization does not have to be a defeating one, as we 
learn from the dialogue of Spelman and Lugones. In articulating the problem, 
Lugones describes for us a classic case of hermeneutical injustice: ―We try to use 
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[your language] to communicate our world of experience. But since your language 
and your theories are inadequate in expressing our experiences, we only succeed in 
communicating our experience of exclusion‖ (575). Here Lugones is literally worried 
not just about the negative valence associated with the term ‗lesbian,‘ but, more 
simply, about the literal translation from English to Spanish: where ‗lesbian‘ 
translates to ‗perversion.‘ Which is why she finds herself at a terrible loss for words 
in this case, yet the problem she expresses is a general one. When we come to you, 
when we do things your way, our experiences are inexpressible and therefore lost. All 
we can do from this position is point to that fact. Yet Lugones warns that ―we either 
use your language and distort our experience not just in the speaking about it, but in 
the living of it, or that we remain silent. Complaining about exclusion is a way of 
remaining silent‖ (575). This expresses something of a hopeless standstill. The way 
feminist theorizing was being done was actually having the effect of silencing the 
voices of some women. In an effort to combat hermeneutical injustice for one group, 
feminist theory was in effect causing it for another.  
Lugones goes on to describe how different it is for a member of a minority 
group to be in the dominant group‘s world from a member of the dominant group 
being in the minority group‘s world. In both cases, she describes these individuals 
being ill at ease. We have seen the way in which the individual member of a minority 
group may be ill at ease in the dominant group‘s world. Their experiences are 
misunderstood, indescribable, invisible. In section one, some of the potential 
epistemic benefits for a member of a minority group operating in the dominant 
group‘s world that fall out of these consequences were discussed. Yet minority group 
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members have no choice but to function in the world of the majority. They must do so 
in order to achieve gainful employment, acquire an education, etc.. Lugones writes,  
[w]hen we are in your world many times you remake us in your 
own image, although sometimes you clearly and explicitly 
acknowledge that we are not wholly there in our being with you. 
When we are in your world we ourselves feel the discomfort of 
having our own being Hispanas disfigured or not understood. (576) 
 
An individual member of the dominant group has a choice of whether or not 
to enter the world of a minority group. If they do so, Lugones argues, they, too, will 
be ill at ease, but in a very different way. She writes,  
there is nothing that necessitates that you understand our world: 
understand, that is, not as an observer understands things, but as a 
participant, as someone who has a stake in them understands them. 
So your being ill at ease in our world lacks the features of our 
being ill at ease in yours precisely because you can leave and you 
can always tell yourselves that you will be soon out of there and 
because the wholeness of yourselves is never touched by us, we 
have no tendency to remake you in our image. (576) 
 
This discrepancy in what it means and feels like to be ill at ease in the worlds of 
others is highly problematic. Individuals of minority groups participating in the 
dominant group‘s world is, in the first place, not optional. In the second, it is 
formative of their identity. In the case of a member of the dominant group entering 
the world of a minority, this entering is (1) optional, and (2) in no way necessarily 
formative of their identity. There is no corresponding take-away from this direction of 
travel. Without it, there can be no genuine understanding of the experiences of 
another. Part of the minority experience is having your self-identity informed by the 
views of others. In coming to understand the experience of another, our self-identity 
has to be informed a necessary recognition of the way they view us. This is part of the 
―what it is like.‖  
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 Lugones proposes a solution to counteract the unbalanced way in which 
someone in a position of power enters in to the world of a minority other. This 
solution has everything to do with our motive for action. She writes,  
The only motive that makes sense to me for your joining us in this 
investigation is the motive of friendship, out of friendship. A non-
imperialist feminism requires that you make a real space for our 
articulating, interpreting, theorizing and reflecting about the 
connections among them-a real space must be a non-coerced 
space-and/or that you follow us into our world out of friendship. I 
see the ‗out of friendship‘ as the only sensical motivation for this 
following because the task at hand for you is one of extraordinary 
difficulty. It requires that you be willing to devote a great part of 
your life to it and that you be willing to suffer alienation and self-
disruption. (576).  
 
So, in effect, because of the significant potential negative impact to this individual, 
her motivation for entering the minority group‘s world in a way that similarly exposes 
her to the threats experienced by minorities entering the dominant world, and 
therefore rendering intelligible their experiences, has to be a untainted one.  
Going as a missionary, to enforce your system of beliefs won‘t do. Going as 
an anthropologist, to serve your self-interest of data-collection won‘t do, either. The 
motivation for going has to, in some way, equalize the differences between these 
individuals or the effect will not be a genuine understanding of what it is like. The 
model of the relationship of friends serves as a perfectly suitable one for equalizing 
these differences. Genuine friendship is a relationship among equals. Traveling to 
another‘s world in the service of becoming their friend puts you on more equal 
footing. Having this equal footing exposes you to this same suffering of ―alienation 
and self-disruption‖ that a member of the minority group experiences when she 
travels to the dominant group‘s world.  
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In their joint discussion concerning what makes a theory a helpful one, 
Lugones and Spellman articulate one feature of such a theory that I believe is a 
helpful guidepost as we consider how to go about doing what we‘re talking about: 
trying to properly grasp the experiences of socially located others. They argue that a 
theory is helpful if it: 
enables one to see how parts of one‘s life fit together, for example, 
to see connections among parts of one‘s life one hasn‘t seen 
before. No account can do this if it doesn‘t get the parts right to 
begin with, and this cannot happen if the concepts used to describe 
a life are utterly foreign. (578) 
 
We need to keep these metrics in mind as we go on to articulate the best way in which 
to foster hermeneutical justice. Losing sight of our objectives, which are highly 
consistent with the claim made here about useful theorizing, may make it the case that 
our recommendations are not sufficient for getting the job done.  
 In elucidating the way in which those in positions of power need to enter into 
the worlds of the oppressed, Lugones specifically spells out some of the conditions 
for being in their world in the same way in which they are in yours: 
So you need to learn to become unintrusive, unimportant, patient to 
the point of tears, while at the same time open to learning any 
possible lessons. You will also have to come to terms with the 
sense of alienation, of not belonging, of having your world 
thoroughly disrupted, having it criticized and scrutinized from the 
point of view of those who have been harmed by it, having 
important concepts central to it dismissed, being viewed with 
mistrust, being seen as of no consequence except as an object of 
mistrust. (580) 
 
Satisfying these conditions makes it the case that your experience of coming to their 
world will not be an imperialistic one. These are features of what it is like to be in the 
dominant world as a member of an oppressed group. Without these same features in 
play, you will not sufficiently know what it is like for them when they come to you 
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and, if you do know that, you miss out on something that is central to their 
experience.  
 Lugones explores some possible motivations for someone going to such 
extreme lengths in this process. First, she wants to rebut the possibility that someone 
would do this out of self-interest. She considers motives of self-interest such as 
spying, and coming to a fuller understanding of oneself. The latter of these self-
interested motives is relevant to our discussion. Lugones believes that one would not 
do this because it is unreasonable to have the expectation to come out of such an 
experience ―whole‖ due to the destabilizing effects of experiencing oppression. I 
argue that one does gain self-knowledge by engaging in such a practice, but not that 
one comes out of it ―whole‖ or unchanged. In fact, coming out of the experienced 
with a fractured sense of self is indicative of having done the job right. This is what it 
feels like for them. This is what it should feel like for you.  
 She also rejects the potential for obligation to be a motive, comparing it to 
making love to someone out of obligation (581). In this way, I think Lugones gets 
something wrong. Her analogy suggests that this action is simply to discharge some 
duty one has to another by engaging in an intimate act without a corresponding 
reciprocal intimate need being satisfied. Harm has been done to the oppressed group. 
Engaging in this behavior is a way of rectifying that harm, of filling in these 
hermeneutical gaps. The oppressed group is not being used as a mere means for the 
epistemic other, although they are being used as a means. What makes this fact 
justifiable is that each party is using the other as a means to an end. On the one hand, 
to hear, and on the other, to be heard. Both have an interest in this exchange. In this 
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way, both parties are intimately engaged and the analogy of making love out of 
obligation seems inappropriate. I want to maintain that this act can and should be 
performed out of obligation, but doing so does not render the oppressed party a mere 
means, nor does it suggest that the intimacy of the act is nonreciprocal.  
 Yet all this work of rejecting possible motives is only building to a stronger 
case for accepting the motive she previously posited as the appropriate one behind 
this exchange—the motive of friendship. And with that contention, as I have 
previously indicated, I have no issue. By pushing beyond obligatory motivation we 
are left with friendship. I believe that the model of the relationship of friendship is a 
helpful, important, and quite possibly necessary one for the work we have in mind. 
Lugones writes,  
If you enter the task out of friendship with us, then you will be 
moved to attain the appropriate reciprocity of care for your and our 
wellbeing as whole beings, you will have a stake in us and in our 
world, you will be moved to satisfy the need for reciprocity of 
understanding that will enable you to follow us in our experiences 
as we are able to follow you in yours. (581) 
 
The process outlined by Lugones and Spelman becomes the thrust behind 
Lugones‘s later work, ―Playfulness, ―World‖-Traveling, and Loving Perception.‖ In 
it, Lugones continues to warn against arrogant perception and argues instead for 
―loving perception‖ (420). Her notion of loving perception is deeply rooted in 
identifying with the subject of your perception. She writes, ―there is a complex failure 
of love in the failure to identify with another woman, the failure to see oneself in 
other women who are quite different from oneself‖ (422). Additionally, Lugones 
argues that a similar failure occurs when you do not adequately recognize as a part of 
yourself the ways in which others perceive you (424). We have already documented 
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this as an essential element of knowing what it is like.  In identifying someone as the 
―other,‖ we are saying something about her, something about her in relation to 
ourselves, and something that she has to internalize to operate in the world, but also, 
we are saying something about ourselves—a point that often gets missed. . If we are 
to properly know what it is like, then we need to incorporate as essential the 
conclusions others draw about us and about us in relation to them.  Lugones writes, 
―The reason I think traveling to someone‘s ―world‖ is a way of identifying with them 
is because traveling to their ―world‖ we can understand what it is to be them and what 
it is to be ourselves in their eyes‖ (432).  
Finally, Lugones identifies four ways in which we can be at ease in a world 
(427). The first is being a ―fluent speaker.‖ What she means by this is that one knows 
all of the right words to be used and the right ways of acting (not quite our ordinary 
sense of the term). The second is by being ―normatively happy,‖ or by being in 
agreement with the customs. The third is by being ―humanly bonded‖ by loving 
others or others loving you. The final way in which one can be at ease in a world is by 
having some shared history in common.  
In carrying out this practice of world-traveling then, we have a lot to keep in 
mind. First, we have to come to these other worlds primarily in the service of 
friendship. Second, we need to accurately see the multiplicity of views of ourselves 
represented to us in that world so we can work to fit them together as essential 
elements of our own self-identity. Third, we need to come humbled and free from 
imperialistic attitudes and intentions. Fourth, we need to identify with the other. And 
finally, we need to find a way to become at ease in that world. If all of these 
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conditions can be met, then it is my contention that through the application of 
Lugones‘ wore we can begin to adequately claim to know what it is like.  
Our final concern to address is whether or not world-traveling is an adequate 
framework for knowing what it is like to be disabled. To respond to this, we must 
consider whether each of the five essential features of world-traveling is possible in 
this case of an able-bodied individual attempting to bridge a hermeneutical gap 
between the dominant discourse‘s understanding of the experience of disability and 
the experience of disability to someone who is, in fact, disabled. If we are able to 
satisfy each of these five conditions in our case at hand, then we are positioned to 
conclude that world-traveling is indeed a useful way of rectifying the hermeneutical 
injustice done to this community. Let us, then, take each consideration in turn. 
First, we have to ask ourselves whether the motive of friendship is a plausible 
one behind an able-bodied individual‘s movement into the world of someone with a 
disability. I think the answer to this question is an obvious one. Surely the differences 
between able-bodied people and people with disabilities does not automatically 
preclude the possibility of genuine friendship. Even if there are alternative 
motivations operating in the background, such as performing an act of charity, or 
wanting to understand someone better, genuine friendships can and do flourish 
between able-bodied and disabled individuals all the time. An example of this might 
be a high school or college student satisfying a service-learning requirement for the 
completion of their degree. Suppose the student chooses to work with a program 
matching volunteers to individuals in the community with Down syndrome with the 
aim of enriching both of their lives and fostering compassion and awareness about 
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Down syndrome among young people. While the initial pairing of these two 
individuals may have been obligatory and random, there is no reason to suppose that 
a genuine relationship of friendship couldn‘t flourish between them. They may find 
that they share interests such as playing basketball or collecting coins and spend their 
time together engaged in such activities while learning more about one another at the 
same time. These friendships can be mutually fulfilling and provide the requisite 
―equal-footing‖ for understanding the world in which a disabled person lives.  
Second, an able-bodied person must be able to get an accurate picture of the 
multiple views persons in a disabled community may have of them, and go on to 
piece these together as an essential part of their own self-understanding. I think in 
cases where a disabled person is able to communicate effectively their opinions of 
this individual to them and feels safe and comfortable in doing so, there is no reason 
to suppose why the project of piecing together a sense of self from these differing 
perspectives must be a barrier. Suppose a hearing person learns American Sign 
Language and pursues a career as a translator. In this line of work, it is likely that she 
would encounter innumerable deaf individuals and may even encounter them in 
highly intimate places, such as if someone were an interpreter working at a hospital. 
Through her interaction with each person with whom she works, she would likely be 
privy to a diverse array of attitudes expressed toward her and her presence in the 
situation, and, additionally, a glimpse into attitudes about interacting with the hearing 
community in general.  
In some cases, she may be made to feel intrusive or unwanted, in others she 
may get a sense of gratitude, and still in others she may pick up on frustrations or 
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difficulty a deaf person is facing in attempting to communicate with someone who is 
not sensitive or responsive, or acting uncomfortably or awkwardly in the presence of 
someone who is deaf. In any of these scenarios, the interpreter is likely able to get 
some sense of that individual‘s feelings about her, her role, and even that person‘s 
attitude towards someone else—someone else who represents another member of the 
dominant group. These feelings and attitudes may be being conveyed by the deaf 
person to the interpreter unwittingly or through their direct interaction. Through these 
experiences, the interpreter is able to piece together a more complete picture of 
herself by including in her own self-conception the feedback she gets from the 
various deaf people that she works with or develops friendships with.  
The third condition to be met for world traveling is to come to someone else‘s 
world humbly and without imperialistic attitudes. Again, I see no necessary barrier to 
this occurring. Of course, it is always going to be the case that an able-bodied person 
initially enters the world of someone with a disability with the dominant discourse‘s 
conception of what it is like to have a disability operating in some way, whether in 
the foreground or the background of this person‘s mind. The question is really one of 
whether these preconceptions can be ―left at the door,‖ or shed along the way. Many 
of the operational conceptions of people with disabilities in the dominant discourse 
are overwhelmingly influential, in particular, I think, the sentimental and biomedical 
narratives of disability. But I believe that the appropriately dispositioned person, 
although they might struggle with it, would eventually be able to approach someone 
with a disability with the humility to admit that their conceptions of living with a 
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disability are informed by something other than accounts of the subjective 
experiences of people who are actually disabled.  
For the most part, I think a person with a disability would expect these 
preconceptions to be in operation and may even be slightly disarmed by someone 
who would freely admit such a thing. Ideally, this would encourage the person with 
the disability to begin to tell the subjective side of the story and, when an able-bodied 
person is exposed to this, they can begin to make room for the subjective account in 
their understanding of living with disability, and they can begin to do it by examining 
their preconceptions in light of this new information and rejecting any former 
conceptions that do not fit. This would exhibit the epistemic virtue of open-
mindedness which, although it is more easily achieved by individuals in oppressed 
groups, can be cultivated in individuals belonging to the dominant group as well.  
The fourth condition to be met for world traveling would constitute the able-
bodied person‘s ability to identify with persons with disabilities. There is nothing to 
suggest that identification with a person with a disability is in any way more difficult 
than attempting to identify with an individual with any other minority identity. How 
do we identify with people who are unlike us? The answer, I think, is in isolating 
characteristics, circumstances, interests, and experiences which are like ours. Why 
should we think that there is any shortage of similarities between members of the 
dominant group and this particular minority group than any other? 
Finally, although it is not entirely clear that this is a necessary condition, for 
successful world-traveling to take place, an able-bodied person has to somehow find 
themselves at ease in the world into which they have traveled. Recall, there are four 
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ways in which one might find oneself at ease. First, in becoming fluent in that world: 
an example of this may be a hearing person literally becoming fluent in American 
Sign Language, and then going on to immerse themselves in the deaf community to 
the degree that they become aware of any unique customs.  
Second, in being normatively happy in that world: it is difficult for me to 
imagine what might be normatively different in a disabled community as compared to 
the dominant group, but I suppose I can hypothesize a few possibilities. One might be 
allowing mentally disabled individuals the ability to consent to having sex. Someone 
may or may not agree with this practice for various reasons yet, if they do agree, then 
they are to some extent normatively happy in that world. Another might be allowing 
Deaf parents to select for embryos that would develop into Deaf babies. Again, there 
are various reasons one might agree or disagree with this practice, but it is the case 
that hearing physicians have assisted Deaf parents in purposely producing Deaf 
children which suggests that it is at least possible for them to be normatively happy in 
that world.  
Third, in being humanly bonded: this would be the case if love were possible 
between an non-disabled person and a person with a disability. Examples of this 
abound. Able-bodied and disabled people fall in romantic love all of the time. Able-
bodied family members love and care for their disabled family members (although it 
might be argued that, by virtue of being related to someone with a disability, then 
they are already in that world) whether the disability was the result of an accident 
later in life or whether they may have been born with it. Finally, as we established at 
the outset of this investigation of applicability, genuine bonds of friendship can be 
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formed between able-bodied and disabled individuals and many friendships are 
characterized by love.  
Fourth, in having a shared history: because in contemporary western society, 
for the most part, people with disabilities are fairly integrated into the community, 
able-bodied individuals and disabled individuals can have a shared history with 
respect to their shared participation in society. For example, an able-bodied person 
and a disabled person may work together. They would have a shared history with 
respect to what has occurred at their workplace over the course of time that they have 
been employed there.  
In sum, then, all five conditions for successful world-traveling can be met for 
able-bodied individuals entering disabled communities. For this reason, it is possible 
that world-traveling is a viable avenue for knowing what it is like to be disabled. 
Because it is possible for an able-bodied person to know what it is like to be disabled, 
it is possible to bridge hermeneutical gaps between disabled communities and the 
dominant discourse. To do so would dramatically enrich our understanding of 
disability and rectify the hermeneutical injustice suffered by the disabled community 
at the hands of the dominant group. World-traveling, then, is a way in which one can 
cultivate the virtue of hermeneutical justice and increase our repertoire of epistemic 
goods. Knowing what it is like, as the distinct end-product of world traveling is 
something distinct from knowing a list of propositional facts about an experience. 
Knowing what it is like is an epistemic good that is at least on par with, and in the 
cases we have explored in this chapter, in many ways preferable to, mere knowledge 
acquisition. In fact, I believe there is reason to suggest that the practice of attempting 
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to learn as much as we can about epistemically located others can get in the way of 
knowing what it is like. Because knowing what it is like requires entering relationships 
with epistemic others with a great deal of humility and the behavior of fact-gathering 
seems to presuppose some superiority. On the one hand we are learning from and on 
the other we are learning about.  
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Conclusion 
It has been argued that there are instances where the pursuit of knowledge 
inhibits our epistemic well-being. In these instances we are better off epistemically to 
resist the urge to pursue (certain sorts of) knowledge, recognize our ignorance and, in 
so doing, enhance our epistemic well-being. The cases explored have ties to 
biomedical or scientific ways of knowing: pregnancy, nursing, and disability. Yet it is 
argued that coming to know in this way can be harmful to us epistemically by 
achieving knowledge unsustainably, surrendering to epistemic imperialism, or 
committing testimonial or hermeneutical injustice.  
While this type of information seeking raises unique issues, such as setting out 
the questions that are worthy of answering and the appropriate ways in which to go 
about answering those questions, it is my contention that these findings pertain to 
areas outside of medical technologies. One place we can begin to look is an example 
from literature.  
In an alternative reading of Shakespeare‘s Othello, Naomi Scheman gives an 
account of what she takes to be the real harm committed by Iago (370). Her 
interpretation suggests that it is not that Iago convinces Othello that Desdemona has 
been unfaithful but instead that Iago changes the terms, or the nature of the evidence, 
required to establish feelings of mutual trust in their relationship. She writes: 
Iago‘s skillful manipulation of the appearances (he doesn‘t exactly lie) is not a 
perversion of scientific reasoning, but, in its power to seduce Othello, a 
demonstration both of the incapacity of such reason to comprehend aspects of the 
world that lie beyond it and the defenseless inability of that world to provide a 
logical, rational proof of its own reality. It needs – demands – no proof, but pressed 
to give one, it will inevitable fail. (370) 
 
This can be seen as a move similar to the one being made by medical professionals in 
the case of the relationship between mother and unborn child. What was once a 
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relationship built on merely the emotional and intellectual insights of the mother (and 
the other women surrounding and attending to her during the pregnancy and labor) 
and the physical sensations of the mother alone is now a relationship forced to fit into 
an unfamiliar mold, subjected to novel questions as well as procedures for answering 
those questions which are responsible for changing the character of their relationship.  
We ought to ask ourselves who Iago is to set out the questions at issue in the 
relationship between Othello and Desdemona. We ought to ask ourselves who the 
doctor is to set out the questions at issue in the relationship between mother and child. 
It is time, then, to establish our own questions, to determine for ourselves reliable 
methods of answering them, and to provide some tentative answers. The question 
proposed here, again, is whether knowledge is always more valuable than ignorance. 
The reasoning behind the response I advocate involves a recognition of some 
potential ‗epistemic harms.‘  Epistemic harms can be understood very much like 
physical harms: they are the intellectual harms suffered by the knower and the known 
alike resulting from certain types of knowledge gaining procedures and, in some 
cases, from the mere knowledge gained by itself. We have encountered several of 
these already, including the impact of ultrasound use on the perceptions of the mother 
regarding her baby and the thrust of probabilistic knowledge of risk to pursue more 
and more evidence to engender worry and fear.  
Iago here functions precisely like the physician in the pursuit for information 
in pregnancy. Iago sets the standard of proof in the same way that technologies 
available to pregnant women set the standard of proof for information about their 
unborn child. By raising the standard of proof, Iago shifts the ability to provide that 
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proof away from Desdemona in the same way that medical technology shifts the 
ability to provide that proof away from the mother. The degree of certainty required 
to count as knowledge is artificially heightened.  
In the formulation of our most basic relationships we agree to a certain 
amount of blind trust. This trust ought not to be understood as wrongheaded. Trust is 
what allows us to build relationships with others, to learn from others. What this trust 
does not do, however, is submit to logical proof. When pressed to conform to these 
heightened standards, trust built in loving relationships cannot provide. Iago‘s 
deception convinces Othello that his relationship to Desdemona must submit to these 
high standards of proof. Iago convinces Othello that trust isn‘t enough, that trust does 
not equate to knowledge, that trust does not establish proof. It is in consideration of 
the function of trust and knowledge in loving relationships that I believe is the most 
promising area for the future application of the present findings. Trust bolsters 
testimonial credibility. 
Iago‘s temptation takes many forms in contemporary culture. The ease with 
which we have access to information regarding another is unprecedented. Pursuing 
this information is as simple as typing a name into a search engine. Suppose you were 
interested in learning more about a new friend or a potential date. By ―googling‖ that 
person, you have unprecedented access to all kinds of information about them. You 
might learn where they work, where they went to school, whether they have children, 
their relationship history, anything they happen to share about themselves on social 
media, and even whether they have any court proceedings on the public record. You 
might develop a distaste for that individual prior to even meeting them. By pursuing 
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that information ahead of time, you work to head off any future ability they have of 
characterizing that information in their own way.  
If we unearthed any information about that person‘s relationship history, we 
could begin to develop a picture of that person that is in no way reflective of the 
meaning they have ascribed to their own history. In this way, we commit 
hermeneutical injustice by preventing their own depiction of their past to gain 
credibility with us as worthwhile information. Instead, we build our own 
understanding without any attention to the way in which it is seen through another 
lens—through the lens of the very person we are attempting to make sense of. 
Undeniably, individuals are in a privileged place to make sense of their histories for 
others, to contribute to and shape depictions of themselves for the others that they 
meet. This seems like one of the most basic ingredients of establishing relationships 
with others. It is not what other people say about that person that should count for us, 
it is what he or she says about him or herself.  
We need to allow space for relationships to develop without the pressure of 
logical proof and the weight of outside information dictating how we see and what we 
believe about others. Coming to know another person adequately requires that we 
begin to see them, and even begin to see ourselves from their angle. The dictates of 
world traveling necessitate that we take seriously the interpretations of epistemic 
others when we attempt to make sense of a situation or a relationship. Without giving 
adequate consideration to the way in which another sees us or sees themselves we 
violate the stipulations of world traveling and we subject others to our own epistemic 
imperialism.  
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While these avenues promise fruitful application, I believe that the most 
appropriate venue remains within the field of biomedical research. As technologies 
advance, it can be predicted that the kinds of things we set out to know will also 
advance. With the capabilities for different sorts of investigation growing, the 
information we seek will continue to shift. If we are not careful in working out for 
ourselves what it is we want to know and the ways in which we feel comfortable 
seeking out information, we risk losing sight of our own interests and becoming mere 
objects of investigation. Medical technologies have worked to shift the location from 
which questions are being asked. It is no longer the patient‘s role to ask questions, to 
limit inquiry into their own care. That power and control has come to the physician 
instead. As patients, we must be careful to exert limitations on the number and nature 
of investigation into ourselves. Projects like unraveling the human genome and 
origins research in pregnancy, while exciting, make available information that we‘re 
simply not ready to behold, information we may not want others to have access to 
either.  
It is my hope that after reading this work we find ourselves better poised to 
answer the question of whether or not we should pursue knowledge of x. Our 
epistemic projects must not be shaped by the Iagos of this world, but instead by our 
own interests and desires, and a concern for the avoidance of the commission of 
epistemic harm.  
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